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The Contempt Power v. the
Concept of a Fair Trial'
By MORTON LANE**
An eminent authority has remarked, "the law is as untidy as
life with which it deals... . ."' Nowhere does this truism apply
more forcefully than to the compartment of law designated as
contempt of court. Consistency is not the outstanding charac-
teristic of the judicial literature dealing with contempt. The
untidiness, perhaps more accurately described as outright con-
fusion, does not seem to have resulted primarily from judicial
inefficiency nor from legislative indifference. Rather it seems
that the uncertainty surrounding contempt litigation stems prin-
cipally from an inherent conflict between two fundamental ele-
ments of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, namely, the contempt power
and the aggregation of individual rights through which we seek
to assure everyone of a fair trial.
Throughout history all courts have claimed and exercised
the power to convict and sentence, sometimes without trial,
those believed guilty of the offense called contempt of court.
Two weighty considerations have justified the assumption of the
contempt power by the judiciary. The efficacy of any judicial
system, federal or state, depends upon the tribunal possessing
sufficient power to maintain order in and about the courtroom
so that proceedings may be conducted in accordance with the
rules deemed most likely to produce a just result. Similarly,
if courts are to be something more than sounding boards for the
exposition of opposing viewpoints, they must have power to en-
force obedience to judicial decrees or other orders. However
compelling these reasons may be, the undoubted necessity for
* This project was financed by a grant from the Walter E. Meyer Research
Institute of Law.
** LL.B., University of Missouri. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Carl Lobell, Senior Law Student, New York University
School of Law.
1 Phillips, Felix Frankfurter Reminisces 21 (1960).
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the existence of the contempt power cannot obscure the fact
that any such power, essentially arbitrary in nature, inevitably
results in some encroachment upon the rights generally ac-
corded those charged with offenses which could result in fines
or imprisonment or both. It is apparent that such a power con-
tains potentialities for abuse probably unequalled in our gov-
ernmental system.?
From ancient times the maxim "no man shall be judge of his
own case" has been utilized to express one aspect of our concern
that every litigant, especially when threatened with a loss of
personal liberty, is entitled to a fair trial before an importial
tribunal. Since most criminal contempt proceedings are in-
itiated by or at the direction of the judge who determines the issue
of guilt (sometimes simultaneously, sometimes subsequently), a
conflict between judicial function and individual rights is in-
escapable. Those accused of contempt claim they are being tried
by a judge lacking in impartiality since the latter acts not only
as judge but, in effect, as prosecutor as well. Often it is con-
tended that the judge's action in commencing contempt proceed-
ings indicates that the issues have been pre-judged adversely
to the alleged contemnor. The conflict between the contempt
power and individual rights is presented in its most virulent form
when the alleged contempt consists of derogatory remarks about
the judge personally, e.g., charges that the judge is corrupt. In
such situations even more important than the precise procedure
by which the contempt issue is resolved is the question: by whom
shall contempt cases be adjudicated to preserve so far as possible
both the necessary power of judicial sanction and the concept
of a fair and impartial trial?
During the past twenty years many cases have dealt with
one or more phases of the conflict between these two equally
important but often competing principles. An attempt will be
made to analyze the cases, particularly those emanating from
the Supreme Court, to determine what trends are discernible.
It is impossible to reconcile the cases either by their results or by
the reasoning contained therein. However, analysis of the varied
and frequently complex situations which produce this clash be-
2 See generally State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N.W. 193 (1897).
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tween judicial power and individual rights reveals the possibility
that the conflict could be rendered less violent than it has been
in the past without engendering any unjustifiable erosion of
either principle.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The cases abound with statements that contempt proceed-
ings are sui generis.3 As -used in the cases, this desgination simply
expresses the conclusion that the procedures employed in con-
tempt proceedings are indispensable to the proper functioning
of the judicial branch of the government. Unique the proceed-
ings may be, but labelling them as such does not contribute to
a solution of the difficult problems presented.
Contempts have long been classified as being either civil or
criminal. We deal here only with the latter variety, i.e., those
actions undertaken to uphold the dignity of the judicial tribunal
and to compel obedience to its orders rather than those insti-
tuted at the behest and for the benefit of a litigant 4
Whether civil or criminal, contempts are further divided into
two categories, direct and indirect or constructive. Generally,
direct contempts consist of those actions committed or words
spoken in the actual presence of the court or so near thereto as
to constitute an obstruction of the proceedings.5 Frequently,
but not always, the judge sees the actions or hears the actual
words constituting the contempt, and in such cases the court may
summarily impose punishment without a trial.6 The contemnor
has no right to be heard, although in its discretion the court may
grant a hearing.7 Indirect or constructive contempts are those
committed outside the presence of the court.8 In such cases
$Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585 (1947) (dissenting opinion by Frank-
furter, J.); Bessette v. W. B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324, 326 (1904); State v.
Barlow, 132 Neb. 166, 271 N.W. 282, 284 (1937).
4 Penfield Co. v. S.E.C., 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947); United States v. United
Mine Workers, 830 U.S. 258, 289-95 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 445 (1911).
5Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 307-09 (1888); see generally 73 Harv. L.
Rev. 353 (1959).
6Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 807-09 (1888); Middlebrook v. State, 43
Conn. 257, 21 Am. Rep. 650 (1876).
712 Am. Jur. Contempt § 70 (1938); Annot., 57 A.L.R. 545 (1929).
8 State v. Winthrop, 148 Wash. 526, 269 Pac. 793 (1928); 7 Hastings L.J.
312 (1956).
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evidence must be heard and the accused is entitled to a fuill
hearing in accordance with all the safeguards afforded defend-
ants in criminal cases, except that the accused is not always
entitled to a jury trial. For the purposes of this discussion, we
accept as settled the proposition that the constitutional right of
jury trial does not extend to cases of criminal contempt."0
Except when courts punish summarily for contempts in
facie curiae, the defendant in criminal contempt proceedings is
entitled to reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard; 1
to the right of counsel;'2 and to the presumption of innocence.' 3
Clear and convincing evidence is necessary for conviction. 4
He may not be subjected to double jeopardy; 5 nor may cruel and
unusual punishment be inflicted upon him.' Actions for criminal
contempt, whether direct or indirect, have generally been held
to be subject to the statute of limitations.'7
CoNTErMT Azn JuDICu, DISQUALIFICATION
The problem of judicial disqualification in contempt proceed-
ings has always been productive of much litigation. Prior to
1940 this litigation was not generally believed to involve serious
constitutional issues. Thus the Supreme Court upheld the power
912 Am. Jur. Contempt § 70 (1938).
'
0 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958). So far as the federal
courts are concerned, Congress has seen fit to grant the right of jury trial: (1)
where the acts charged also constitute a criminal offense under federal or state
law, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3691 (1958); (2) where the contempt arises out of the
alleged violation of an injunction or restraining order issued under federal labor
laws, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3692 (1958); (3) in certain special cases under the Civil
Rights Act where the sentence is a fine in excess of $300 or imprisonment for
more than 45 days, then the accused may secure a new trial before a jury,
71 Stat. 638 (1957), 42 U.S.C.A. § 1995 (Supp. 1960). State courts likewise
have held the right to jury trial inapplicable to contempt proceedings. State ex rel.
Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927).
"1 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 537 (1925).
12 Ibid.
13 United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349, 363 (1950); see also Ex parte
Hudgings, 249 U.S. 378 (1919); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911).
14 Fox v. Capital Co., 96 F.2d 684 (3d Cir. 1938).
1In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943).
16 United States ex rel. Brown v. Lederer, 140 F.2d 136, 139 (7th Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 322 U.S. 734 (1944).
1T Pendergast v. United States, 317 U.S. 412 (1943); see also Gompers v.
United States, 233 U.S. 604 (1913); Pate v. Toler, 190 Ark. 465, 79 S.W.2d 444
(1935); State v. Phipps, 174 Wash. 443, 24 P.2d 1073 (1933); Contra, Ponick
v. Owsley, 364 Mo. 544, 264 S.W.2d 332 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 822
(1954).
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of a federal court to punish summarily for a contempt in facie
curiae though the defendant had left the courtroom and was not
present when found guilty of contempt.' The contention that
a court may be disqualified by virtue of having initiated con-
tempt proceedings received short shrift at the hands of Mr.
Justice Holmes.19 The asserted disqualification of the Supreme
Court of Colorado from sitting in contempt proceedings based
upon publications derogatory to that court was held by Mr.
Justice Holmes not to involve constitutional issues. There the
court had been charged with rendering decisions for political
purposes rather than in accordance with the law, and the de-
fendant publisher sought to establish as a defense the truth
of the charges he had made. 0
A letter, delivered to the judge in chambers, which im-
punged his integrity in a case recently decided and urged his
future disqualification in related proceedings was held con-
temptuous, but the Court ruled that due process was violated in
the contempt proceedings, because the defendant was not
afforded an opportunity to be heard and to have the assistance
of counsel." In remanding the case, the Court directed that in
view of the nature of the charges, the re-trial should take place
before another judge.22 The removal or disqualification of the
particular judge was obviously not based on constitutional
grounds, since the Court recognized that a judge has jurisdic-
tion to hear and determine contempt charges based upon con-
tempts committed before him, even those involving him per-
sonally. Significantly, it cautioned that judges should not per-
mit themselves to be driven from a case through the medium of
contempts directed against the judge personally.23
Two years later, although not in a contempt case, the Supreme
Court first invoked the due process clause of the fourteenth
18Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
1' United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906).20 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). The holding that truth is not
a defense to a charge of criminal contempt will be further discussed, infra, at 399.
Because of his holding that truth would not be a defense, Mr. Justice Holmes
found it unnecessary to determine whether the fourteenth amendment made ap-
plicable to the states the prohibition against abridging freedom of the press im-
posed upon the federal government by the first amendment. Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions on this point are discussed, infra, at 864.
21 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).




amendment as a basis for the disqualification of a state court
judge.24 A defendant charged with violating a state prohibi-
tion act was held to have been denied due process when tried
by the mayor of a village who received compensation for act-
ing as a judge only when he convicted the defendant and in
such event his compensation was a percentage of the amount
collected from the defendant.25
Before 1940 no court permitted one charged with direct con-
tempt to urge the disqualification of the judge;26 nor could one
so charged obtain a change of venue .21 While there is a disagree-
ment as to whether legislative enactments providing for the
disqualification of judges by reason of bias, interest, relation-
ship, etc. are applicable to any contempt proceedings, such
statutes have never been regarded as pertinent to direct con-
tempts.2 Underlying the results in all of these cases is the feel-
ing, sometimes expressed and sometimes implied, that any court
without power to protect itself from direct insult could not dis-
charge its functions.29
Indirect or constructive contempts have been differently re-
garded. The power of the legislature to make change of venue
statutes or general disqualification statutes applicable to this
type of contempt proceeding has usually been sustained.30 Even
in the absence of legislation, many cases have recognized the
power of the judge to recuse himself,31 and some have required
2 4 Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
25 A further ground for the holding was the fact that the village whose
affairs the mayor administered likewise received a substantial percentage of any
funds collected from the defendant.
26 For a comprehensive annotation of the cases wherein judges in contempt
proceednigs were sought to be disqualified because the contempt involved thejudge, see Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 600 (1959). A specially appointed court in State
ex el. Short v. Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 256 Pac. 681 (1927), disqualified some
of its members from sitting in a direct contempt proceeding but that decision
was not followed by subsequent Oklahoma cases. See discussion, infra, at 358.2 7 Connell v. State, 80 Neb. 296, 114 N.W. 294 (1907).
2 8 Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 600, 607 (1959).
29 See Blodgett v. Superior Court, 210 Cal. 1, 290 Pac. 293 (1930); Lamb-
erson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91 Pac. 100 (1907); Myers v. State, 46 Ohio
St. 473, 22 N.E. 43 (1889).80 Briggs v. Superior Court, 211 Cal. 619. 297 Pac. 3 (1931); In re Opinion
of the Justices, 86 N.H. 597, 166 Ad. 640 (1933). But see Bloom v. People, 23
Colo. 416, 48 Pac. 519 (1897); Prine v. State, 143 Miss. 231, 108 So. 716 (1926).31 Cornish v. United States, 299 Fed. 283 (6th Cir. 1924): Toledo News-
paper Co. v. United States, 237 Fed. 986 (6th Cir. 1916), aff'd, 247 U.S. 402
(1918); Back v. Nebraska, 75 Neb. 603, 106 N.W. 787 (1906); Ex parte Pease,
123 Tex. Crim. App. 43, 57 S.W.2d 575 (1933).
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that this be done where the contempt consisted of a personal
attack upon the judge.32
One of the most colorful chapters in the history of contempt
proceedings had its genesis in a controversy which rocked the
State of Oklahoma in the 1920's. The cases which it produced
illustrate, perhaps better than any others, the head-on clash be-
tween judicial powers and individual rights in many contempt
cases. Inasmuch as the judges in those cases found themselves
confronted with problems of extreme difficulty, with potent
arguments having been adduced by both sides, the cases turned
largely upon the premise from which each judge started. Those
regarding the effective operation of the courts as being of para-
mount consideration had little or no difficulty in sustaining the
courts power to deal by way of contempt proceedings with a
disappointed litigant's attack upon the integrity of the court.
An opposite result was reached by those judges who took as
their text the proposition that every man is entitled to be tried
by a tribunal impartial not only in fact, but impartial in appear-
ance as well.
The controversy was the aftermath of commonplace corporate
litigation. A minority stockholders' action had charged waste
and mismanagement by those controlling the Riverside Oil &
Refining Company, including one Owens. After extended liti-
gation, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma issued an opinion in
which substantial issues were determined in favor of the plain-
tiffs. By means of newspaper advertisements and by a petition
for rehearing, Owens charged fraud on the part of the court. He
alleged, among other things, that the opinion rendered had not
been written by the justice purporting to write it, but rather
by counsel for the prevailing side; that the opinion had been
handed down without consideration by any of the justices of the
pleadings, evidence or briefs; and that an earlier opinion in said
corporate litigation was prepared by a justice under the direc-
tion of the chief justice who was allegedly in conspiracy with
plaintiffs' lawyers. Owens commenced an action against most
of the judges, plaintiffs' lawyers and others charging conspiracy
32 In re Dingley, 182 Mich. 44, 148 N.W. 218 (1914); Snyder's Case, 301
Pa. 276, 152 AtI. 33 (1930). See also Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517
(1925).
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and fraud. Based upon the charges made in the newspaper ad-
vertisement, Justice Riley filed a libel suit against Owens seek-
ing $200,000 damages. Subsequent to the filing of these law
suits and to the filing of the petition for rehearing, the court
directed that contempt charges be brought against Owens
and his attorney. Upon the filing of the contempt charges, both
Owens and his attorney urged the disqualification of the court
on the grounds of prejudice and interest. After overruling the
attorney's motion to disqualify, seven of the nine judges of the
court nevertheless voluntarily certified their disqualification in
the proceeding against the attorney and seven practicing at-
torneys were appointed by the governor as judges in that case.
Thereupon the attorney sought a writ of mandamus to compel
the disqualification of the two justices who had refused to dis-
qualify themselves. Out of this involved factual situation emerged
seven decisions by various courts. Some of the opinions are dif-
ficult to distinguish from political orations, and almost all might
be charged with generating more heat than light.
1. In the mandamus proceeding the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa (seven members specially appointed) in a five-to-four
decision held that even in contempt cases it had the power to
disqualify one or more of its members from participating in a
case where the disqualification "is apparent on account of ex-
traneous matters not connected with the contemptuous act it-
self." 3 The pending litigation affecting the challenged justices
was held by the majority to be so intimately connected with
the contempt proceeding as to render those two justices interested
and therefore disqualified.
Justice Riley dissented,34 urging that he could not be deemed
interested since the outcome of the contempt proceeding could
not affect the pending litigation in which he was involved; that
33 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 32, 256 Pac. 681,
687 (1927). In so ruling, the court said:
It is a maxim of common law, the wisdom and propriety of which
will not be questioned, that 'no one should be a judge in his own
cause.' When it is determined that a judge of a court of record is
prejudiced in a cause, he is incompetent to sit in said cause, and the
exercise of jurisdiction therein by him in adjudging the issues is be-
yond his power. Apart from authority, it is inconceivable that the
people of the English race intended at any time to deprive their courts
of the power to secure to every citizen an impartial trial before an
impartial judge and an unprejudiced tribunal. Id. at 28, 256 Pac. at 684.
84 Id. at 38, 256 Pac. at 691.
[Vol. 50,
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no case in American jurisprudence ever held a judge otherwise
qualified to be disqualified from disposing of a contempt com-
mitted before him or the tribunal of which he is a part; that no
court except the one contemned has the right to pass upon con-
tempt proceedings. 35 Justice Riley also said:
[I]n contempt cases a judge cannot, and should not, be
recused for prejudice alleged or proven. This rule is dif-
ferent in civil and criminal matters. The word 'prejudice'
cannot be said to apply to contempts committed after
a litigant has accepted the forum. If so, when a litigant
observed that an unfavorable decision to him was about to
be rendered, he need but to strike the court, then allege
that by reason of the blow the court and judge thereof
were biased and prejudiced against him, and therefore the
judge must stand aside, and continue such acts ad in-
finitum. Such should not be the law.36
srAmong the numerous cases cited in support of this proposition, see
Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91 Pac. 100 (1907), wherein the
court said:
Nor is the judge disqualified from sitting in the contempt proceedings.
Petitioner's theory in this regard, if we understand it, is that the judge
is disqualified from hearing the proceedings in contempt, because the
contempt itself consists in imputations upon his motives, and attacks
upon his integrity. Such is not and never has been the law. The posi-ion of a judge in such a case is undoubtedly a most delicate one, but
his duty is none the less plain, and that duty commands that he shall
proceed. However willing he may be to forego the private injury, the
obligation is upon him by his oath to maintain the respect due to the
court over which he presides. As was said by the Chief Justice of
this court In re Philbrook. 105 Cal. 471, 38 Pac. 511, 45 An. St. Rep.59 (1884), 'The law which in such cases makes us the judges of
offenses against the court places us in an extremely delicate and in-
vidious position, but it leaves us no alternative except to allow thecourt and the people of the state, in whose name and by wh se a-
thority it acts, to be insulted with impunity, or to exercise the au-
thority conferred by law for the purpose of compelling attorneys tomaintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. Were
the rule otherwise so that it was required that another judge should be
called in to sit in the proceedings, the recalcitrant and offending party
would need only to insult each judicial officer in tutrn until the list
was exhausted, and thus. by making a farce of legal procedure, goscatheless and unpunished. Id. at 461-62, 91 Pac. at 101.
s6 Sttcx reZ. Attorney Cen. v. Martin, 125 Ola. 24, 49-50, 256 Pac. 681,701 (1927). The following excerpt from Judge Riley's opinion is typical of the
verbal polemics produced. He said:We are resolved that acts of a disgrnntled litigant and of a vexatious
and ill-informed counsellor shall not drive us from the path of duty,
and we shall not prostitute ourselves byr voluntarily accepting theeasier way. We observe the historic words of Madame Roland when
she said: 'Oh, iberty, how many crimes are committed in thy name!'And we determined, in so far as our acts shall be effective, thatthe respondent cannot convert his own misdeeds into a shield againsthis own wrongs; that he should not be permitted to profit by his own
perversity. Id. at 50, 256 Pau. at 702.
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Justice Clark, whose disqualification was also sought, joined
in the opinion of Justice Riley. Two of the appointed justices
also dissented upon the ground that no precedent authorized
the disqualification of a judge from hearing contempt proceed-
ings arisign out of a case properly before him.
Pursuant to the wishes of the majority, Justices Riley and
Clark certified their disqualification and two special justices were
appointed in their stead.
2. After extensive hearings the specially appointed court
found Owens' attorney guilty and imposed a fine upon him.ar
It held that the filing of the petition for rehearing constituted a
direct contempt; that the charges therein made against the court
were false, the only evidence of truth being the uncorroborated
testimony of Owens which consisted, for the most part, of hearsay
testimony, all of which was denied by all of the persons when
Owens claimed to have been quoting; and that the attorney
had not acted in good faith in relying on the unsupported charges
made by his client without attempting to verify them.8
3. In the contempt proceedings against Owens,"0 the regu-
larly constituted Supreme Court denied Owens' motion that the
members (except one) disqualify themselves. One judge, how-
ever, voluntarily certified his disqualification. Owens was found
guilty of contempt and sentenced to a year in prison. On the
issue of disqualification the court held that in dealing with a
direct contempt its members were not disqualified though the
contempt consisted of charges against one or more individual
members of the court; that, in ordering the institution of the
contempt proceedings, the court did not thereby become dis-
qualified; that no disqualification resulted from Owens aver-
ment that the judges would be called as witnesses because a
litigant "is not entitled to destroy the court which presides against
87 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Martin, 125 Okla. 51, 256 Pac. 667 (1927).38 lllustrative of the intense feelings characterizing these proceedings is
the fact that, during the hearings, one of the regular justices of the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma indulged in fisticuffs with one of Martin's attorneys and said
Supreme Court justice was himself found guilty of contempt by the specially
appointed Supreme Court. Notwithstanding his inability to control his emotions
and his actions, he refused to disqualify himself in the contempt proceedings
against Owens and, not surprisingly, voted to find Owens guilty.89 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927).
The opinion was written by Justice Riley, who had instituted a libel action
against Owens, said action being based upon the very statements which the
court undertook to punish as contemptuous.
[Vol. 50,
TAE CoNrmr PowEa
him by the subtle proposed use of the judges as witnesses in his
behalf."40 The action of the court in denying the motion to dis-
qualify had the effect of overruling, so far as the doctrine of
stare decisis is concerned, that portion of the decision of the
specially appointed court which upheld the right of one charged
with direct contempt to urge the disqualification of one or more
members of the court.
The court three times called upon Owens to produce any
evidence he might have as to the truth of his charges and three
times he stood mute, not even calling as witnesses the judges,
who in his motion urging the disqualification of most of the
members of the court, he had asserted would be called. The
court then held the charges untrue and that they were made
without probable cause.
4. Within a few minutes after having been convicted of
contempt and sentenced by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma,
Owens presented an application for a writ of habeas corpus to
one of the judges of the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals.
While denying the application, the judge directed the sheriff
detaining Owens to show cause why a writ of habeas corpus
should not be issued. Thereupon the Supreme Court of Okla-
homa issued a writ of prohibition against said judge and against
the entire Criminal Court of Appeals prohibiting him and it
from entertaining the petition for a writ of habeas corpus.4'
Apparently the Supreme Court took this action on its own mo-
tion (in itself a most unusual step and one of doubtful legality).
So far as here material, the Supreme Court justified its issuance
of the writ of prohibition upon the ground that it and it alone
had jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings, but even if it
erred in so holding because of its ruling on the question of dis-
qualification, its judgment would be voidable not void, and
thus not subject to collateral attack; that where the right to
urge the disqualification of a judge exists it is a personal priv-
ilege of the litigant as distinguished from a right enforced in all
cases upon grounds of public policy; and that a ruling on such a
claim of privilege whether correct or incorrect may not be col-
laterally attacked.
40 Id. at 69. 256 Pac. at 707.
41 State ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Davenport, 125 Okla. 1, 256 Pac. 840 (1927).
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5. Notwithstanding the writ of prohibition issued by the
Supreme Court, the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals heard
Owens' application for a writ of habeas corpus, granted it and
ordered him discharged.42 Among other things, that court held
that Owens' allegations regarding fraud, prejudice, etc. must
be taken as true since the sheriff failed to deny them (the sheriff
was precluded from so doing by an injunction entered by the
Supreme Court contemporaneously with its issuance of the writ
of prohibition). It further held that a judgment in a criminal
case by a disqualified judge was absolutely void, that contempt
was a crime in Oklahoma, and that the justices of the Supreme
Court were disqualified in the Owens case because of the pend-
ing libel suit of Justice Riley and because of the fact that all
other justices might file similar suits. Numerous other grounds
for its ruling were asserted in an extremely lengthy opinion but
they are not pertinent to this inquiry.
6. After the decision by the Criminal Court of Appeals, the
sheriff who had custody of Owens sought a writ of certiorari
from the Supreme Court. That court issued the writ and quashed
the judgment of the Criminal Court of Appeals upon the ground
that the Criminal Court of Appeals had no authority to override
the decision of the Supreme Court.43
7. The last act of the lengthy drama saw Owens seeking
a writ of habeas corpus from the federal district court. That
court denied the writ and its order was affirmed by the Circuit
Court of Appeals which held that no federal question was pre-
sented by the action of the state Supreme Court in construing
the Constitution and statutes of that state.44
The Oklahoma litigation highlights the dilemma, possibly
insoluble, frequently confronting courts in contempt cases. When
a disappointed litigant seeks to drive from the case a judge or
judges responsible for his disappointment, whatever court passes
upon the contempt proceedings arising from such efforts must
balance their effect upon the proper functioning of the judiciary
against the right to trial by an impartial tribunal possessed by
all litigants, even those charged with contempt of court. It
42Ex parte Owens, 370 Okla. Crim. App. 118, 258 Pac. 758 (1927).
4 3 Dancy v. Owens, 126 Okla. 37, 258 Pac. 879 (1927).4 4 Owens v. Dancy, 86 F.2d 882 (10th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 746
(1929).
[Vol. 50,
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seems strange that, prior to 1940, considerations of due process
and the right to a fair trial played little or no part in the deter-
mination of direct contempt cases. The predominant emphasis
was upon the judicial function rather than upon individual rights.
In the past twenty years, as will be seen, the emphasis has
shifted. The trend, although by no means a consistent one, has
been toward placing contempt cases on the same footing as other
litigation insofar as the rights of the defendant are concerned.
INDIRECT CONTEMPT SINCE 1940
During the past two decades the United States Supreme Court,
more often than in any comparable period of its history, has
had occasion to pass upon cases involving criminal contempt.
In general these decisions have resulted in a limitation of the
power of courts, both federal and state, to punish for contempt.
In the federal courts, ever since the celebrated controversy cen-
tering around Judge Peck,45 the court's power to punish for
contempt has been limited to "misbehavior of any person in its
presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of
justice . . ." and to two other categories not here material.4
Prior to 1941, the words "so near thereto" were held to include
any misbehavior, no matter where it occurred, which actually
obstructed or reasonably tended to obstruct the administration
of justice.47 This holding was reversed in 1941 when the Court
decided that the words "so near thereto" must be given a geo-
graphical rather than a causal meaning.48 In the 1941 case, the
misbehavior consisted of the use of liquor to induce an illiterate
and feebleminded person to abandon a wrongful death action
then pending. The court held that such misbehavior could not
be punished through the use of the contempt power because
it occurred more than one hundred miles from the place where
the district court sat.
Further limitations on the contempt power resulted from
subsequent cases. The case of In re Michael9 added two new
45 Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal
Contempts in 'Inferior' Federal Court-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37
Harv. L. Rev. 1010 (1924).
40 18 U.S.C.A. § 401(1) (1958).47 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).48 Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 33 (1941).
49326 U.S. 224 (1945).
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limitations. Perjury, standing alone, was held not to constitute
a sufficient basis for punishment for contempt by a federal
court.50 Although a court "officer" within the meaning of the
contempt statute,51 the testimony before a grand jury of a trus-
tee in bankruptcy was held not to be "an official transaction"
within that statute.5 2 Despite the numerous Supreme Court and
other decisions describing attorneys as officers of the court, an
attorney was held not to be an "officer" as that term is used in
the federal contempt statute and he therefore could not be tried
for contempt because of alleged "misbehavior" in contacting
members of a grand jury which had indicted his client.5
In a series of cases the court has imposed far-reaching limi-
tations upon the use of the contempt power to punish news-
paper publishers and writers for their comments on pending
litigation. No longer is it sufficient, as was true in 1941,54 that
the published matter reasonably tend to obstruct the admin-
istration of justice. Freedom of the press, expressly protected
from federal interference by the first amendment and protected
from state interference by the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment, has now been held to justify all publications
except those involving a clear and present danger to the ad-
ministration of justice.5 5 In no case has the court yet found
any such danger to have been present. Thus, in a five-to-four
decision, a state court was denied the right to use its contempt
power when a powerful newspaper attempted, through an edi-
torial, to persuade a judge to deny probation to two men con-
victed of assault.5 Likewise, the majority opinion found no
sufficient danger to the administration of justice from the pub-
lication of a telegram by an influential labor leader threatening
a strike along the entire Pacific coast waterfront in the event of
the enforcement of a particular judicial decision.57 A unanimous
court-unanimous in voting but not in its reasoning-reversed
SO Id. at 228.
5118 U.S.C.A. § 401(2) (1958).52 n Ire Michael, 326 U.S. 224 (1945).
53Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956). This limitation on the
contempt power has been applauded. Luther, Recent Trends Curtailing the
Summary Contempt Power in the Federal Courts, 8 Hastings L.J. 56 (1956).
54 Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
55 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).)6 id. at 272.
57 Id. at 276-78.
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the state court contempt convictions based upon newspaper
editorials and a cartoon depicting certain Florida courts as
subservient to the criminal element.58 Specific state court find-
ings that a clear and present danger to the administration of
justice resulted from publications designed to prejudice and in-
fluence a court's ruling on a pending motion for a new trial
were disregarded and contempt convictions were reversed in a
six-to-three decision wherein the majority by independent an-
alysis found no such danger, even though conceding that the
news articles were inaccurate and that the editorial constituted
unfair criticism.59
The foregoing limitations upon substantive aspects of the
contempt power have been accompanied by actions in the pro-
cedural area apparently designed to make it more probable that
contempt proceedings will be governed by the same standards
of fairness applicable to other litigation. The Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure became effective in 1946. The right of
a judge to punish summarily for direct contempts committed
in his presence was re-affirmed.6 0 Substantial changes were made
in the procedure governing cases where one charged with con-
tempt is formally tried. Whenever a contempt involves "dis-
respect to or criticism of a judge," the rules require that it be
tried before some other judge unless the defendant consents
to a trial by the offended judge.61 This provision is applicable to
all indirect contempts and to those direct contempts which,
for any reason, are not punished summarily. Before Rule 42(b)
was promulgated, no hard and fast rule governed situations where
contempt proceedings arose out of charges reflecting upon the
judge himself. Chief Justice Taft had, in the Cooke case,62
58 Pennekamp v. Florida, 828 U.S. 881 (1946).
59 Craig v. Harney, 881 U.S. 367 (1947). It is not within the scope of this
article to appraise the possible effects of this and similar decisions in creating
a situation w ereby "trial by newspaper" may become the rule rather than the
exception. Possibly, the effect of newsaper comments is to be measured bydifferent standards, depending upon whether the court is reviewing an ordin-
ary criminal case or a contempt proceeding. See Irvin v. Dowd, 866 U.S. 717
(1961), where the court reversed a criminal conviction because newspaper pub-
licity adverse to the defendant had created a situation where a fair trial was
not possible.
60 Fed. B. Crim. P. 42(a). The manner in which the Court has apparently
modified this provision is discussed, infra, at 882.
61 Fed. B. Crim. P. 42(b).
62 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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rendered certain advisory remarks for the guidance of federal
judges in determining the propriety of their sitting in particular
cases. 63 In effect, Rule 42(b) converts that advice into an ab-
solute rule mandatory upon all federal judges. The circumstances
under which the contempt occurred are no longer material nor
does Rule 42(b) concern itself with the motive of the contemnor,
even though the statements might have been made in a palpable
attempt to drive a particular judge from the case. Since the
words "disrespect to or criticism of a judge" have not yet been
definitively construed, it is difficult to appraise the probable
effect of Rule 42(b). If the quoted words are by construction
limited to situations wherein personal wrongdoing by the judge
has been charged, then the rule would seem to be a good one.
Indirect contempts seldom, if ever, create an emergency situa-
tion and the action of any trial judge in setting an alleged direct
contempt down for trial rather than punishing it summarily is
indicative of the absence of any emergency. Under these cir-
cumstances it seems desirable that a judge in no way personally
affected by the allegedly contemptuous statements should de-
termine the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Procedural limitations upon the contempt power have not
been restricted to proceedings in federal courts. A witness
before a Michigan "one-man grand jury" was held to have been
denied procedural due process when the judge, in his capacity
as grand juror and acting in secret, informed the witness that
his testimony was false and evasive, summarily charged him with
criminal contempt, convicted and sentenced him.64 Constitu-
tional violations were found in the secrecy of the contempt
proceedings and in the failure to afford the witness a reason-
able opportunity to defend himself-notice, the right to counsel,
the right to cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and the
right to testify.
Thereafter a Michigan one-man grand juror who initiated
contempt proceedings sought to comply with the Oliver ruling by
proceeding in public and by affording the defendant a full trial.
Nevertheless, the contempt conviction which resulted was held,
in a six-to-three decision, to violate due process upon the ground
63 Id. at 539.64 In re Oliver, 383 U.S. 257 (1948).
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that the judge could not function both as prosecutor and as
judge. 5 Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the majority, said:
Fair trials are too important a part of our free society to let
prosecuting judges be trial judges of the charges they pre-
fer. It is true that contempt committed in a trial court-
room can under some circumstances be punished summarily
by the trial judge. See Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S.
517, 539. But adjudication by a trial judge of a contempt
committed in his immediate presence in open court can-
not be likened to the proceedings here. For we held in
the Oliver case that a person charged with contempt be-
fore a 'one-man grand jury' could not be summarily
tried16
The court further said:
Moreover, as shown by the judge's statement here, a 'judge-
grand jury' might himself many times be a very material
witness in a later trial for contempt. If the charge should
be heard before that judge, the result would be either
that the defendant must be deprived of examining or
cross-examining him or else there would be the spectacle of
the trial judge presenting testimony upon which he must
finally pass in determining the guilt or innocence of the
defendant. In either event the State would have the benefit
of the judge's personal knowledge while the accused would
be denied an effective opportunity to cross-examine. The
right of a defendant to examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses is too essential to a fair trial to have that right
jeopardized in such way.67
In the Murchison case the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment was, for the first time, utilized by the court
to prevent a particular state court judge from adjudicating a
contempt case. (It will be remembered that the Tumey case
dealt with ordinary criminal litigation, not with contempt). Ob-
viously, the Murchison rule could have broad implications.
Under the "one-man grand jury" system, the judge appointed
to that position operates as investigator, prosecutor and grand
juror. These are active functions, the discharge of which re-
quires the formulation of opinions concerning factual situa-
65 In re Murchison, 849 U.S. 183 (1955).
6o6d. at 137.
6r Id. at 138-39.
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tions which may be material in subsequent litigation and also
concerning the credibility of witnesses whose testimony may be
essential. Few would quarrel with the Murchison ruling insofar
as it holds that such functions are inconsistent with the later
reassumption of the judicial role for the purpose of passing upon
the contempt which originated before the judge while acting as
a grand juror. Opinions formed or impressions gained while
functioning as investigator or prosecutor are not apt to be
diseregarded merely because a person dons judicial robes to
deal with an alleged contempt. Whether the judge formally
appears as a witness or merely determines the issue upon the
basis of his prior impressions, the defendant's rights would
seem to be violated.
While Murchison dealt with a rather special situation, a one-
man grand jury, some of the present justices of the court would
apply the reasoning of that case broadly.68 They would deny
federal judges (and the same reasoning would apply to state
court judges) the right to try any indirect contempt cases aris-
ing out of disobedience of orders issued by that judge and based
upon charges preferred pursuant to his direction.69 As yet, those
finding a conflict akin to that of the Murchison situation have
not been able to muster a majority of the court for the applica-
tion of that doctrine to ordinary contempt situations. Thus, where
a corporate official was convicted of criminal contempt under
Rule 42(b) for having failed to produce documents called for
by a subpoena in a criminal trial then pending, the majority in
a five-to-four decision saw nothing wrong in the trial being
held before the judge who initiated the proceedings since the
contempt involved no "disrespect to or criticism of a judge."70
However, three members of the minority urged that the wrong
judge had tried the case, Mr. Justice Black saying:
I believe that it is wrong in a Rule 42(b) proceeding for
the same judge who issued the orders allegedly disobeyed
and who preferred the charges of contempt on his own in-
itiative and based on his own knowledge to sit in judg-
ment on the accused. In essence, this allows a man who
68 See dissenting opinion of Black, J., in Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S.
885, 396 (1957).69 bid.
7ONilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385 (1957).
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already believes that another .person has disobeyed his
command to act as both prosecutor and judge in a pro-
ceeding to 'decide' formally whether that person disobeyed
him and should be punished. It is contrary to elemental
principles of justice to place such power in the hands
of any man. At the very least, another judge should be
called upon to try the contempt charges. Here, besides
issuing the orders allegedly disobeyed and then citing
petitioner for contempt, the trial judge was intimately in-
volved in earlier proceedings from which the contempt
charge developed and in which evidence relevant to that
charge was presented. Under such circumstances he would
have been superhuman not to have held pre-conceived
views as to petitioner's guilt.71
So, too, the majority in another five-to-four decision upheld
the propriety of a judge, whose surrender order had been dis-
obeyed by the contemnor, presiding over the subsequent trial
for criminal contempt.72 In a vigorous dissent,73 Mr. justice Black
(joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas), un-
successfully sought to persuade his fellow justices that those
charged with criminal contempt are constitutionally entitled to
trial by jury. In the course of that opinion, he argued:
Summary trial of criminal contempt, as now practiced,
allows a single functionary of the state, a judge, to lay
down the law, to prosecute those who he believes have
violated his command (as interpreted by him), to sit in
'judgment' on his own charges, and then within the broad-
est kind of bounds to punish as he sees fit. It seems in-
consistent with the most rudimentary principles of our sys-
tem of criminal justice, a system carefully developed and
preserved throughout the centuries to prevent oppressive
enforcement of oppressive laws, to concentrate this much
power in the hands of any officer of the state....
When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor,
judge, jury and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge, he
is obviously incapable of holding the scales of justice
perfectly fair and true and reflecting impartially on the
guilt or innocence of the accused. He truly becomes the
judge of his own cause. The defendant charged with
criminal contempt is thus denied what I had always
71 Id. at 402-03 (dissent).72 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958).
78Id. at 198 (dissent).
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thought to be an indispensable element of due process
of law-an objective, scrupulously impartial tribunal to
determine whether he is guilty or innocent of the charges
filed against him.74
Carried to their logical conclusion, the views espoused by
Mr. Justice Black in the Nilva and Green cases would prohibit
any judge from trying cases of indirect contempt based upon
alleged violations of orders or decrees issued by that judge, par-
ticularly if, as is usually the case, the judge has also caused the
contempt proceedings to be initiated. The due process clause
should not, in my opinion, be extended that far, nor should the
Supreme Court impose such restrictions upon inferior federal
courts pursuant to its supervisory authority over them. Indi-
viduals (or corporations) may be accused of violating numerous
types of laws, i.e., those established by legislative declaration
(statutes), judge-made law as laid down by prior decisions, and
rulings by judges or administrative agencies which in particu-
lar cases are binding upon specified individuals. The Black argu-
ments impliicity assume that judges, for some undisclosed reason,
are more vindictive and less judicial when it comes to enforc-
ing the law represented by their own orders than they are when
dealing with cases of violations of law laid down by others.
No factual basis for such an assumption has ever been shown
to exist.
Mr. Justice Black and those who agree with him have not
specified whether they believe that any impairment of judicial
efficiency would result from a requirement that judges other
than those whose orders have allegedly been disobeyed should
preside over contempt hearings. An earlier Supreme Court
specifically considered this matter,75 saying:
But the power of a court to make an order carries with it
the equal power to punish for a disobedience of that or-
der, and the inquiry as to the question of disobedience
has been, from time immemorial, the special function
of the court. And this is no technical rule. In order that
a court may compel obedience to his orders, it must have
the right to inquire whether there has been any disobedi-
ence thereof. To submit the question of disobedience to
741d. at 198-99.7 5 1nre Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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another tribunal, be it a jury or another court, would op-
erate to deprive the proceeding of half its efficiency.76
(Emphasis added.)
It seems indisputable that some loss of judicial efficiency
would result from transferring to a new judge all indirect con-
tempt cases, even those not involving personal disrespect to the
judge who would ordinarily try the particular case. Whether
the loss would be one-half as stated in the Debs case, or some-
what more or less, is impossible to say. At the very least, there
would be a great duplication of judicial time and effort and
substantial delay, because the new judge would have to familiar-
ize himself with the background surrounding the issuance of
the order allegedly violated and with the intent of the court
issuing the order. Indiscriminate transfer, as proposed by Mr.
Justice Black, could have other undesirable results. Particularly
in those areas where a limited number of judges, sometimes
only one, would be available to replace the disqualified judge,
the doctrine of indiscriminate transfer might open the door to
much "shopping around" by a disappointed litigant in an effort
to secure a judge more likely to favor his viewpoint. To the
extent that such shopping around resulted in delay, as would
always be the case, or that different results would be obtained
at the hands of the new judge, as would sometimes be the case,
there would inevitably be a corresponding diminution of re-
spect for and obedience to all judicial tribunals.
One can only speculate as to the eventual significance of the
Murchison case. Only four years after that case, the court
rendered a decision which, if not actually in conflict with Murchi-
son, represents a broad step contrary to the whole trend of the
past twenty years toward limiting the contempt power wherever
possible. In Brown v. United States,77 a witness before a federal
grand jury, which was investigating possible violations of the
Interstate Commerce Act, refused to testify on grounds of pos-
sible self-incrimination. The grand jury sought the aid of the
district judge who ruled that the witness would be granted an
76 Id. at 594-95. There were, of course, no electronic computers at the
time of the Debs decision and the court did not indicate by what mathematical
process it arrived at the result that transfer of the duty to determine the ques-
tion of disobedience would destroy half of a court's efficiency.
77859 U.S. 41 (1959).
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immuniy from prosecution and directed him to answer the
questions. After again refusing to answer, the witness was
brought before the judge who, in the presence of the grand jury,
repeated the questions. Upon his continued refusal to answer,
the witness was summarily convicted of criminal contempt under
Rule 42(a). In a five-to-four decision, the court affirmed the
conviction.7 For the majority, Mr. Justice Stewart upheld the
procedure used upon the ground that, although the witness
might have been proceeded against under Rule 42(b) for his
refusal to answer before the grand jury, nevertheless his sub-
sequent refusal in the judge's presence authorized action under
Rule 42(a). He noted that the contempt was in no sense per-
sonal to the judge.
Chief Justice Warren dissented and was joined by Justices
Black, Douglas and Brennan.79 In his view, the witness should
have been convicted only under Rule 42(b) where he might
have presented a defense or demonstrated extenuating circum-
stances (possible fear of gangster reprisals). He said:
Rule 42(a) was not inserted in the Rules in order to
ease the difficulties of prosecuting contempts. It was not
meant to authorize the practice of having government
prosecutors force persons who had already committed
contempts outside of the presence of the court to repeat
the action before the court and thus subject themselves
to deprivation of their rights under Rule 42(b). Given
the purpose of Rule 42(a) with its admittedly precipitous
character and extremely harsh consequences, this court
should not countenance a procedure whereby a contempt
already completed out of the courts presence may be re-
produced in a command performance before the court
to justify summary disposition .... so
Surprisingly, neither majority nor dissenting opinions refer-
red to the Murchison case. The relationship seems clear cut.
Any difference between the two is one of degree rather than of
kind. In repeating the questions theretofore put to the witness
by the grand jury, the judge in the Brown case in effect assumed






one-man grand jury would have acted. The cases are, of course,
distinguishable in that the judge in the Brown case simply took
over the role of inquisitor. He did not assume an investigatorial
function nor did he usurp the grand jury's right to determine
whether or not to indict. Nonetheless, it cannot be denied that
the judge in the Brown case temporarily merged the roles of
prosecutor and judge. Since, in the Murchison case, the convic-
tion was reversed although the recalcitrant witness received a
full hearing and had an opportunity to present any available
defense or any matter in mitigation, it seems beyond dispute
that the Michigan judge-grand juror in that case could not have
reconvened court and repeated the identical questions that the
witness had refused to answer previously and then summarily
convicted him. Clearly, this would have been prohibited by
the Oliver case. Yet this is exactly what a federal judge was
allowed to do in the Brown case. That witness, after being
interrogated by the judge, was convicted and sentenced without
any trial at all. The rule of the Murchison case should have
been applied in the Brown case, at least to the extent of assur-
ing the witness a full trial. Proper procedure would seem to have
required that he be tried, not for his refusal to answer the ques-
tions put by the judge, but for his prior refusal to answer the
questions put to him by the grand jury. Such a trial would have
presented no question of judicial disqualification.
Furthermore, the Brown holding can hardly be reconciled
with that in Yates v. United States."' There, during her trial for
conspiracy to violate the Smith Act, the defendant refused to
answer questions on cross-examination designed to identify oth-
ers as members of the Communist Party. During the course of
the trial, in an effort to coerce answers to the questions, the
defendant was imprisoned for civil contempt. When the trial
was concluded, she was summarily convicted and sentenced for
criminal contempt pursuant to Rule 42(a). The conviction was
affirmed in a six-to-three decision. However, the Court held
that the defendant had committed only one contempt, and that
contempts may not be multiplied by the asking of related ques-
tions within an area in which the witness had already refused to
81855 U.S. 66 (1957).
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answer. If, as there held, the multiplication of contempts deal-
ing with the same subject matter is prohibited, then how can
it be proper to compel a witness to repeat a contempt already
committed before a grand jury in the presence of the judge,
solely for the purpose of justifying summary proceedings under
Rule 42(a)? Surely the rights of an alleged contenmor to a full
and fair trial where one would ordinarily be held should be no
less subject to abrogation by judicial sleight-of-hand than the
right of an alleged contemnor not to be convicted more than
once for what is essentially the same contempt.
The lack of consistency in the Court's approach to contempt
problems is further evidenced by the case of Levine v. United
States. 2 The facts were identical with those of the Brown case.
In another five-to-four decision, the Court upheld the power of
the district court to proceed summarily under Rule 42(a) against
a defendant compelled to repeat in front of the court a con-
tempt originally committed before the grand jury. The issue
actually determined was that the defendant's constitutional rights
were not violated by the action of the court in excluding the
public (other than defendant's counsel) from the courtroom.
Contempt proceedings were held not to be criminal prosecutions
within the meaning of the sixth amendment. It was held that
the due process clause of the fifth amendment had not been vio-
lated because defendant's counsel, although requesting a trial
under Rule 42(b), had not specifically objected to the exclusion
of the public. In so ruling, it would seem that the majority
confused the due process question with the possible waiver by
the defendant of any violation of due process that might have
occurred. While Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the ma-
jority, called the case "wholly unlike" the Oliver case, 3 the only
recognizable difference between the two is that Levine was
permitted to have counsel. Upon the secrecy issue, the cases are
not distinguishable. It has never been held that federal judges
have any more right to proceed secretly than do state court
judges.
The tendency heretofore noted of recent Supreme Court
decisions (other than the Broum and Levine cases) to limit the
82862 U.S. 610 (1960).
83 Id. at 619.
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contempt power and, as exemplified by the Murchison case, to
disqualify particular judges from hearing contempt cases has
been followed by the various state courts. Almost all recent
state court cases have required the disqualification of the judge
when indirect contempt prosecutions have been based upon
imputations of wrongdoing by the judge or comments or action
otherwise personally disrespectful to him.8s
One court has even gone so far as to reverse a contempt con-
viction upon the ground that the wrong judge heard the case
where the issue of disqualification was never raised until the
case reached the highest court in the state.85 In that case the de-
fendant had been convicted for having represented to a corres-
pondent in a divorce action that a favorable decision could be
purchased through the defendant's intercession with the court
reporter or the judge. Even though the defendant, by failing
to object to the procedure, apparently indicated his willing-
ness to have the judge alluded to try the contempt proceeding,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey held it improper for him to
have done so. This might be described as "automatic disquali-
fication" since its application was not dependent upon timely
action by the defendant. In this respect the rule goes further
than the federal courts are required to do under Rule 42(b).
In a federal case the defendant's consent to trial by the of-
fended judge would undoubtedly be implied from his failure
to object.
Where an indirect contempt consists of attacks upon the
integrity of the judge, the rule of "automatic disqualification"
laid down in the Van Sweringen case should be followed. If, as
has often been stated, 6 it is of basic importance that courts shall
not only do justice but shall give the appearance of doing so,
then it should be recognized that the appearance of injustice,
84 Turkington v. Municipal Court, 85 Cal.App.2d 631, 193 P.2d 795 (1948);
State ex rel. Moser v. District Court, 116 Mont. 305, 151 P.2d 1002 (1944);
Ponder v. Davis, 233 N.C. 699, 65 S.E.2d 356 (1951). But see In re White,
340 Mich. 140, 65 N.W.2d 296 (1954), where the Supreme Court of Michigan
held unconstitutional a statute providing for the disqualification of a judge from
hearing contempt proceedings when the alleged contempt was committed before
that judge acting as a one-man grand jury. This case, a companion case to
Murchison, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court on grounds of
procedural due process. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
85 Van Sweringen v. Van Sweringen, 22 N.J. 440, 126 A.2d 334 (1956).86Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954).
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arising when a judge tries a contempt case where the allega-
tions concern him personally, is equally great when the defendant
does not urge judicial disqualification as when he does.
The past twenty years have, so far as indirect contempt
is concerned, witnessed a tendency to resolve the conflict be-
tween judicial function and individual rights in favor of the
latter. The outstanding development has been the elevation, in
the Murchison case, of the problem of judicial disqualification
into one of constitutional significance. Important though Mur-
chison may be, the uncertainty that has long existed concerning
the proper scope of the doctrine of judicial disqualification can
hardly be said to have been removed simply because the prob-
lem has now been stated in constitutional terms. At this time
it cannot be foretold whether Murchison represents the high-
water mark of the trend toward disqualification or whether it
represents merely a significant stepping stone in the evolution
of a broad doctrine of judicial disqualification in all contempt
cases. The Brown case and the majority opinions in the Nilva
and Green cases seem to indicate that the scope of Murchison
will be limited to those situations where the judge actively en-
gages in some function inconsistent with a strictly judicial role
or where there is a direct connection between the judge per-
sonally and the allegations which form the basis of the contempt
charges. The dissenting opinions in the Nilva and Green cases
presage the possibility that a future shift in the membership
of the Supreme Court will bring about a very substantial ex-
tension of the doctrine of judicial disqualification in all cases
of indirect contempt. The uncertainty is not limited to the
field of indirect contempt. Contemporaneous developments dis-
close at least as much uncertainty in direct contempt situations.
DIRECT CONTEMPT SINCE 1940
Three recent decisions of the Supreme Court have produced
some change in the law of direct contempt. Analysis of the
cases suggests the possibility of further far-reaching changes,
some of which are of questionable desirability.
In Fisher v. Pace,87 plaintiff's counsel repeatedly sought to
87836 U.S. 155 (1949).
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set before the jury in a workmen's compensation action the
number of weeks' compensation his client might receive and the
rate thereof, although the jury was concerned only with special
issues as to the extent and duration of the injury. An objection
to counsel's argument was sustained. He was granted an excep-
tion and told not to argue the matter further with the court.
After he again referred to the irrelevant subjects, the court in-
structed the jury to disregard counsers statement and again
admonished against further argument. When counsel persisted,
a heated exchange between court and counsel ensued. During
the colloquy the court said, "Il declare a mistrial if you mess
with me two minutes and a half, and fine you besides." The
continuance of the colloquy saw the court imposing a fine of
$25, then of $50, then a sentence of three days in jail, and finally
the fine was increased to $100 and the sherifE was directed to re-
move counsel. The actions by the court brought forth from
counsel such remarks as, "If that will give you any satisfaction,"
and, "You know you have all the advantage by you being on
the bench." Upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the
Supreme Court of Texas upheld the commitment.18 In a five-
to-four decision the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment. 9 For the majority, Mr. Justice Reed held that the
summary conviction and punishment did not violate due process
and that the inability of the transcript to depict counsels ex-
pression, manner of speaking, attitude, etc., necessitated reli-
ance upon the fairness of the presiding judge.90
Three dissenting opinions were written in the Fisher case.
Mr. Justice Douglas (joined by Mr. Justice Black) dissented
upon the ground that the attorney was entitled to reasonable
freedom of speech in attempting to protect his client's rights.
Mr. Justice Murphy thought the disagreement too petty to war-
rant the use of the drastic contempt process. Mr. Justice Rut-
ledge contended the judge was obviously so angry as to be
88Ex parte Fisher, 146 Tex 328, 206 S.W.2d 1000 (1948).
8 9 Fisher v. Pace, 386 U.S. 155 (1949).90 Interestingly enough, Mr. justice Reed laid stress upon the fact that the
contemnor was an officer of the court. Cf. Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S.
399 (1956), supra, at 364. Surely the fact that the Fisher case arose in a state
court whereas Cammer originated in a federal court has no real significance.
A lawyer's status as "an officer of the court" and the duties accompanying such
status hardly vary from court to courL
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unable to render the calm and unbiased action which due process
requires in any judicial proceeding.
Standing alone, the Fisher case represents no change. It is
illustrative of a typical direct contempt proceeding where, im-
mediately upon the occurrence of the contemptuous acts, the
court acts promptly and summarily in order to maintain con-
trol of the courtroom proceedings. No case has ever held a
judge disqualified from acting in this type of situation. Of the
dissenters, only Mr. Justice Rutledge urged disqualification.
The most interesting vote in this case was that of Mr. justice
Frankfurter. He voted with the majority although he has since
become one of the most outspoken advocates of judicial dis-
qualification in contempt cases. Neither the summary nature
of the proceedings, nor the fact that the contempt was adjudi-
cated by a judge who had been "involved" in an acrimonious
colloquy with the contemnor seemed improper to Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in 1949. Apparently, Mr. Justice Frankfurter had
not yet adopted the views subsequently expressed by him in
Sacher v. United States9" and in Offutt v. United States.92
Sacher v. United States93 presented a direct contempt situa-
tion where the trial judge deferred punishing allegedly con-
temptuous attorneys until the completion of the main case, a
nine-month trial involving alleged Smith Act violations by eleven
Communist Party leaders. After receiving the jury's verdict, the
trial judge filed a certificate, pursuant to Rule 42(a), finding
defendants' counsel and one defendant who acted as his own
counsel guilty of criminal contempt on numerous grounds and
imposing jail terms up to six months. The Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed the contempt convictions and sentences although
it reversed some specifications of contempt 4 The Court limited
its review to the question of whether he contempt charge was
properly determined by the trial judge under Rule 42(a) rather
than by some other judge under Rule 42(b). By a five-to-three
vote, it held that the trial judge was authorized to proceed under
Rule 42(a). Justices Frankfurter, Black and Douglas dissented.
91343 U.S. 1 (1952).
92348 U.S. 11 (1954).
93343 U.S. 1 (1952).94 United States v. Sacher, 182 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1950).
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The behavior punished consisted of breaches of decorum and
disobedience of the judge's orders by defendants' attorneys, all
of which took place in the presence of the trial judge. Mr. Jus-
tice Jackson wrote the majority opinion and held that a trial
judge must have discretion to determine whether to punish
direct contempt immediately or at the conclusion of the trial,
that he need not punish "while smarting under the irritation of
the contemptuous act,"95 that the trial judge properly heard the
case, and that he was not required to assign it to some other
judge and become merely the accusing witness. The opinion
states:
It is almost inevitable that any contempt of a court com-
mitted in the presence of the judge during a trial will be
an offense against his dignity and authority... It cannot
be that summary punishment is only for such minor con-
tempts as leave the judge indifferent and may be evaded
by adding hectoring, abusive and defiant conduct toward
the judge as an individual. Such an interpretation would
nullify, in practice, the power it purports to grant.96
Mr. Justice Black dissented, joined by Mr. Justice Douglas, and
urged, so far as here material, that another judge should have
passed on the charges because the trial judge's impartiality
was necessarily impaired by his belief that defendants' counsel
had conspired to break down his health.9 7 Mr. Justice Frank-
furter dissented upon the ground that summary action is im-
proper when the judge finds it unnecessary to punish during the
trial and upon the further ground that another judge should have
heard the contempt charges to preclude the trial judge from
acting as both accuser and judge.
Two years later, in Offutt v. United States,9 8 the Court again
reviewed a situation where a trial judge punished an attorney
for direct contempt at the conclusion of the trial rather than
when the contempt was committed. During a criminal trial in
which the charge was abortion, defense counsel and the judge
continually argued with one another. Defendant's counsel had
95 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 11 (1952).
96 Id. at 12.97 He also argued that the contemnors should have been given notice and
an ovortunity to defend themselves, and that they were entitlec to a jury trial.
348 U.S. 11 (1954).
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persisted in asking, without proper foundation, questions which
the court regarded as manifestly improper and prejudicial. He
was repeatedly warned of the consequences of his disregard of
the court's rulings. The judge's resentment of the attorney's
tactics was evidenced by his statement that counsel had "for-
feited your right to be treated with the courtesy that this court
extends to all members of the Bar"99 and when discharging
the jury the court referred to the attorney's "disgraceful and
dreputable performance."100 The conviction in the principal case
was reversed upon the ground that the court had excessively
interfered with the examination of witnesses and that its com-
ments toward defendant's counsel reflected bias and hostility,
all of which prevented a fair trial.1"' The contempt conviction,
however, was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals, but the
punishment was reduced from 10 days to 48 hours.'02 The
Supreme Court reversed this conviction by a vote of five-to-three
and remanded the matter for trial before a different judge. 03
Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion and described
the judge as "involved," "personally embroiled," and the con-
tempt charge as "entangled with the judge's personal feeling
against the lawyer." While not disputing the guilt of the attorney
he ruled, relying upon the Cooke case,'0 4 that the trial judge
should not have determined the contempt charge. Justices
Reed, Burton and Minton dissented.
The Offutt case did not purport to overrule Sacher, the ma-
jority opinion stating that the court would not "retrace" the
ground covered in Sacher. While the court may have regarded
the two cases as distinguishable, no such distinction is apparent.
The Offutt opinion made no comparison of the degree of judicial
"involvement" in the two cases. If anything, it would seem that
the judge in the Sacher case was more personally involved. He
believed the contemptuous acts and statements were part and
parcel of a conspiracy to break down his health and thus cause
a mistrial. He further believed that the contemnors frequently
99 Id. at 17.
100 Ibid.
o1 Peckham v. United States, 210 F.2d 693 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
102 Offutt v. United States, 208 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1953).108 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
104 Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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lied to and about him. The Offutt case disagreements between
court and counsel pertained to counsel's tactics in seeking
to defend his client, tactics which the judge thought repre-
hensible but which had no direct connection with him as an
individual. The absence of any substantial distinction between
Sacher and Offutt was noted by Chief Justice Warren who, in
his dissent in the Brown case, 05 referred to Offutt as an instance
where the viewpoint of the dissenters in a prior case Sacher
had been adopted.
It is entirely possible that the different results in Sacher and
Offutt can be accounted for only by the changes in the personnel
of the court during the two years between the cases. No justice
who voted with the majority in Sacher supported the majority
opinion in Offutt. In Sacher the majority consisted of Justices
Jackson, Vinson, Reed, Burton and Minton. During the time
interval between Sacher and Offutt, Mr. Justice Warren became
Chief Justice in place of Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Mr. Justice
Jackson died but his successor had not been appointed when
Offutt was decided. The Offutt majority consisted of Justices
Frankfurter, Warren, Black, Douglas and Clark.
Whatever may have been the reasons for the court's shift
between Sacher and Offutt, the effect of the Offutt case could
well be substantial. For the first time, the doctrine of disqualifica-
tion (although not specifically so labelled) has been utilized to
prevent a trial judge from punishing contemptuous acts commit-
ted in his presence during the actual trial of the case. This
represents an expansion of the rule enunciated in the Cooke
caseP°° where the contempt had reference to one matter as to
which the trial had already been completed and to other related
matters not yet on trial. Nor is it likely that the Offutt rule will
be limited to the peculiar factual situation there presented.
While Offutt dealt with a situation where punishment for the
contempt was deferred until after the close of the trial in progress,
the time of punishment apparently played no part in the court's
determination. The rationale concerning judicial "involvement"
is equally applicable to a situation where the judge punishes the
contempt immediately. The future extension of the Offutt rule to
105 Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 61 (1959).
"O Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
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cover that situation seems fairly predictable. As an example of
the Court's exercise of supervisory authority over inferior federal
courts Offutt is not, strictly speaking, binding upon state courts.
However, where the degree of judicial "involvement" by a state
court is such that the Court would intervene if the case had
originated in a federal court, it seems likely that the Court will
hold that the judicial "involvement" transgresses the due process
clause. 07
In effect Offutt has written into the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure a new limitation upon the power of a trial judge to
punish for contempt. Before that case, a trial judge might punish
any direct contempt occurring in his presence. Offutt requires
that in proceedings under Rule 42 (a) the contempt must not only
have occurred in the judge's presence but the circumstances must
have been such as to indicate that the judge was not "involved."
The Court's interpretation of Rule 42(a) seems to vary from
case to case. In Sacher it was applied as written. In Offutt, how-
ever, the Court engrafted onto the rule a limitation not fairly
inferrable from its text. Yet, several years later the court per-
mitted an extension of Rule 42(a). In Brown v. United States,108
what was essentially an indirect contempt was converted into a
direct contempt by the judge's action in assuming the role of
inquisitor. This conversion enabled summary punishment to be
inflicted upon the contemnor, bypassing the hearing procedure
required by Rule 42(b). While there may be no conflict between
the actual holdings in Offutt and Brown, it seems impossible to
reconcile the two entirely different approaches to Rule 42(a)
revealed by those cases.0 9
Though the Offutt holding may be criticized by reason of the
fact that it is inconsistent with other Supreme Court decisions
and because it rewrote Rule 42(a), its major vice is far more
107 Cf. In re Murchison, 849 U.S. 188 (1955); In re Oliver, 383 U.S. 257
(1948). If, as held in Murchison, due process requires an impartial judge, then
it would seem immaterial whether the judicial "involvement" arises out of the
judge's exercising a dual function such as judge and prosecutor or whether it
arises in some other way. It is the involvement that is important rather than
the source thereof.
108 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
lo9 As already noted, supra, at 374, Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610
(1960), extends the inconsistency still further. The majority opinion in that
case several times cited the Offutt case with approval. Actually the Levine case
further modifies Rule 42(a) by sanctioning the practice of summary contempt
convictions in a court room from which the public has been barred.
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fundamental. It is noteworthy that there was no charge that the
judge had been "fixed," nor was it contended that he was dis-
qualified due to interest or relationship. Instead, the so-called
"involvement" in'that case arose solely out of the judge's resent-
ment of counsel's tactics. Under those circumstances, the argu-
ments advanced by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his opinion and in
his dissent in the Sacher case are far from conclusive. It seems
probable that the rule there announced will create more difficul-
ties than it solves and it could well undermine the effectiveness
of judicial control of courtroom procedures.
The majority opinion in Offutt contains neither a definition of
"involvement," nor any criteria by which to determine the degree
thereof necessary to disqualify a particular judge. Unless the term
"involvement" be limited to situations of personal dishonesty on
the part of the judge, or to those rare cases where extraneous cir-
cumstances affirmatively demonstrate personal bias, it seems im-
possible to define the term in any way that will afford guidance to
judges in future cases. This is not a problem of semantics but
rather one of practical appraisal of the nature of our judicial
system and the setting out of which contempt charges most
frequently arise. Courtroom contempts may occasionally be
described and dealt with as desperate efforts to divert the course
of justice, but by no means always. In large part, such contempts
are a product of the adversary system upon which we rely so
heavily in our quest for truth. That system necessarily engenders
hotly contested situations where emotions run high and where
neither actions nor words can always be the result of careful
consideration. To keep contests within reasonable bounds and
properly directed toward an impartial determination of the issues,
the presiding judge must have authority to control them. As
pointed out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring opinion
in Green v. United States,"' ever since 1789 all Supreme Court
justices have recognized this power as essential for the proper
functioning of any judicial system. Even those justices who have
urged (unsuccessfully) that contemnors are constitutionally en-
titled to trial by jury have recognized the necessity for an
exception for contempts in facie curiae."'
110356 U.S. 165 (1958).
" Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (dissenting opinion by Black,
J.); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (dissenting opinion by Black, J.).
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The manner in which such control may be exercised obviously
varies from judge to judge depending partly upon the tempera-
ment of any particular judge, but it is certainly neither unusual
nor improper for judges to engage in colloquy with counsel.
Among the many justifications for such action is the desire to
define more precisely the point at issue, to explain a ruling or the
reasons therefor, or to indicate the permissible boundaries within
which the controversy may proceed. Offutt seems to require that,
in any case where the judge has been something more than a
mere automation grinding out rulings on motions or objections
to evidence, he refrain from using the contempt power upon
which, in the final analysis, his control of the proceedings depends.
Precisely at the point where control may be most necessary, Offutt
commands a judge to abandon his judicial role and to limit his
further participation, if any, to that of an accusing witness before
some other judge.
The stenographic transcript will, if accurate and complete,
always show what words have been spoken; but courtroom con-
tempts do not consist only of spoken words. Actions, which may
or may not appear in the record, and offensive mannerisms,
including the manner of speech which never appears in the record,
may also constitute contempt. Necessarily, as noted in the ma-
jority opinion in the Fisher case, the trial judge is in the best
position to pass upon such contempts." 2
The untoward effects of the Offutt ruling and its probable
extensions seem almost limitless. They would not, as some might
assume, affect only the contempt proceeding but would rever-
berate throughout the remainder of the trial of the principal case
and possibly throughout any future proceedings involving some
or all of the participants in the contempt proceeding.
In the trial of the contempt proceeding before another judge,113
the original presiding judge would ordinarily be the chief accusing
witness. Having assumed that role, he would then be subjected
to what might reasonably be expected to be an intensive cross-
examination-particularly if some of the elements of the allegedly
112 Fisher v. Pace, 836 U.S. 155, 161 (1949).
118 That the hearing before a second judge cannot be summary, even
though the charge be direct contempt, but must accord the defendant full rights
of defense is demonstrated by what happened on the remand of the Offutt case.




contemptuous conduct were such as might be observed by the
trial judge but would not necessarily appear in the record. Often
and obviously so, it is extremely difficult to portray by words a
course of conduct that might in fact have been highly con-
temptuous. Thus, in many cases, the outcome of the contempt
proceedings would depend more upon a judge's skill as a witness
than upon the intelligence and discretion which he applied to the
discharge of his judicial duties. Where the judge-witness re-
garded the contemnor's manner of speaking and demeanor as
contemptuous and where this was disputed during the contempt
proceedings, it is only natural that the cross-examiner would
employ the weapons of ridicule and sarcasm in an effort to
demonstrate that the judge-witness was either mistaken, or that
he acted maliciously against the alleged contemnor. Given that
situation, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's remarks in his dissent in the
Sacher case" 4 concerning the ability of the second judge to con-
trol the cross-examination of the judge-witness seem unsound.":5
There is no reason why a judge appearing as a witness should be
accorded greater immunity from cross-examination than any
other witness. Indeed, any artificial limitation of the scope of
cross-examination should be held to violate due process." 6
A contempt proceeding tried before another judge can, when
viewed realistically, hardly escape the appearance of being just
as much a trial of the accusing judge as that of the alleged
contemnor. Under these circumstances some judges might refrain
from instituting contempt charges because they believe the
resulting trial would, irrespective of its result, be detrimental to
the dignity of the judiciary and the respect in which it should
be held or because they believe it more important not to abandon
their other judicial duties. Other judges might cause the contempt
charges to be brought but deprive the proceedings of much of
their force by not appearing as a witness."7 While no conscien-
'l 4 Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952) (dissent).115 Similar sentiments were expressed by the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia in reversing the second Offutt conviction for contempt.
Offutt v. United States, 232 F.2d 69 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
988 (1956).
116 Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
117 While the reason for his non-appearance does not appear, it is a fact that
the trial judge did not testify in the second contempt proceeding against Offutt.




tious judge is likely to be deterred from bringing contempt charges
by the possibility that as judge-witness he might find himself
standing alone, this possibility should not be overlooked when
appraising the overall effect of the Offutt rule. It is notoriously
difficult to procure medical testimony in malpractice cases, no
matter how aggravated a particular case may be. Similar con-
siderations might impel lawyers not to testify against other law-
yers accused of contempt. It is not lightly to be presumed that
the axiom, "There, but for the Grace of God, go r' affects only
the medical profession.
If, notwithstanding the numerous reasons which might dis-
suade a judge from initiating contempt charges which could only
be held before another judge, a judge did institute contempt
charges and particularly if he forsook his other judicial duties in
order to testify, there is little doubt but that his future judicial
efficacy would be impaired in the event that the contempt charges
were not sustained by the judge who ruled thereon. The situation
then presented would in no way be comparable to the ordinary
reversal of a judge for an error of law or for a mistake in weighing
the evidence. Whether the adverse result in the contempt pro-
ceedings were attributed to honest mistakes by the judge-witness
or to a general lack of credibility, it seems most unlikely that in
the future that judge could, and possibly he would not even try to,
maintain the same degree of control over courtroom proceedings.
Nor is it clear that the results of trying a contempt proceeding
before a second judge would be accorded any more respect. In
the event of a conviction, those willing to substitute suspicion for
proof would argue that judges always "stick together."
The undesirable results would not be confined to the contempt
proceeding. Among other things, they would affect the principal
case out of which the alleged contempt arose. Suppose, in Offutt,
instead of waiting until the close of the abortion trial, the judge
(being blessed with foresight and thus able to anticipate the
Supreme Court theory of "involvement") had informed defense
counsel during the trial that his remarks and conduct were deemed
contemptuous and that charges would be filed against him and
heard by some other judge upon the conclusion of the principal
case. At that point, would not counsel have been justified in
seeking a mistrial of the abortion case upon the ground that the
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judge was so "involved" as to render him lacking in impartiality?"'
For that matter, once the judge had become "involved" by engag-
ing in colloquy with the defense counsel and by expressing
adverse opinions as to counsels tactics, would he not then have
been disqualified irrespective of whether or not he cited defense
counsel for contempt either immediately or at the close of the
trial? Would the judge's "involvement" with counsel ever be
separable from his assumed attitude towards counsel's client? If,
somehow, these obstacles were overcome, numerous others would
remain.
Whatever the outcome of the contempt proceeding or of the
principal case, future complications would inevitably arise. Few
witnesses enjoy being subjected to a rigorous cross-examination.
Most witnesses resent the cross-examiner and the tactics he uses.
That resentment might reasonably be expected to linger for a
considerable period. Whenever the lawyer who had conducted
the cross-examination of the judge-witness had a case pending
before that judge or whenever the defendant in the contempt
proceeding was active in another case, would not either or both
be entitled to urge disqualification upon the "personal involve-
ment" theory? When would the "involvement" cease? What, if
any, action might the "involved" judge take to purge himself of
the "involvement"? These questions, always inherent in the situa-
tion created by this judge made rule of disqualification suggest,
and perhaps compel, the conclusion that the majority in the Offutt
case addressed itself to the wrong question entirely.
As a human being, it is only natural that the more aggravated
the contemptuous acts or words, the more likely it is that the
judge whose responsibility it is to maintain the dignity of the
courtroom will be irritated and even angry. It is submitted that
the real question which the Court should have decided was
whether or not Offutt had been guilty of contempt. The majority
did not dispute the findings of the trial judge on the issue of guilt
and the affirmance thereof by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
Among the lower court findings upheld by the Circuit Court were
11 8 The fact that the conviction of Offutt's client was subsequently re-
versed because of excessive judicial interference seems immaterial in this con-
nection. There is nothing in Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion, either by way
of definition or discussion, to indicate that "involvement" exists only when the
trial court's conduct has already permeated the case with reversible error.
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those finding counsel guilty of "insolent, insulting and offensive
remarks to the court"; that in spite of admonitions from the court
he had persisted in repeating questions previously excluded by
the court; that without foundation he had asked highly prejudicial
questions, such as asking the victim of the abortions, "When were
you arrested in this case?," although said victim had never been
arrested; and that he had sought to create an episode that would
lead to a mistrial. All of these findings were buttressed by nu-
merous record references.
Whether the contemptuous outbursts left the judge angry or
indifferent would seem to have been irrelevant. If the record
disclosed sufficient evidence of guilt, the conviction should have
been affirmed as was urged by the dissenters. If, on the other
hand, the record disclosed insufficient evidence of guilt and indi-
cated that the trial judge had substituted anger for proof, then the
conviction should have been reversed. The third possibility is
that the record might have left the matter in doubt. In that event,
the conviction should have been reversed and the case remanded
for reconsideration by the trial judge. In any ordinary case, other
than those involving statutory grounds of disqualification or for a
change of venue, errors of law or rulings contrary to the weight of
the evidence result in reversal of the cause and in its being
remanded for retrial, not before a different judge but before the
same judge. It is never assumed that a prior error, no matter what
its nature, will prevent a judge from giving proper consideration
to the matter on retrial. No reason is apparent why a different
rule should have been invented for use in contempt proceedings." 9
In our judicial system, situations involving the possible wrong-
ful deprivation of individual liberty have always caused grave
concern, and rightly so. Despite many procedural and substan-
tive safeguards, we have not been able to devise a foolproof
system. Occasional miscarriages of justice do occur. It is always
possible that, in violation of his oath, the judge will decide a case
upon some basis other than the evidence and the law. The pos-
sibility of a miscarriage of justice in contempt cases does not
seem appreciably greater than in other types of cases. With the
exception of those situations wherein the contempt consists of
119 Throughout this discussion, those special situations involving charges
against the judge personally are omitted. Those are discussed infra, at 394.
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charges of misconduct by the judge-himself, there seems to be no
reason for believing that "personal involvement" would result in
any more arbitrary and unjust decisions than would the ever-
present but unproven possibility that a particular case has been
decided because of the judge's prejudice for or against a person's
race or creed. Certainly, the possibility of wrongful action where
a judge has not deemed himself disqualified does not seem to be
sufficiently great to warrant embarkation upon a substantial
alteration of the delicate judicial mechanism. If, as most of the
present justices are willing to assume, our trial judges are men
(and women) of sufficient hardihood to withstand the expressed
or implied commands of powerful newspapers commenting upon
pending cases, 20 then surely they are equally capable of with-
standing any emotional pressures arising out of colloquy between
court and counsel concerning legal matters not relating to the
judge personally. In the Cooke case, upon which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter relied so much in the majority Offutt opinion, there
were charges of judicial wrongdoing. Not only were there no
such charges in Offutt but no publicized opinion reveals any indi-
cation that the alleged contemnor challenged the qualification
of the judge. Unless the Court chooses to limit the Offutt case to
its own factual situation, the theory of "personal involvement"
there enunciated seems likely to dilute or possibly to render
completely ineffective judicial control of courtroom proceedings.
The difficulties of applying the Offutt rule of "personal in-
volvement" are well illustrated by the most recent contempt
proceeding passed upon by a federal appellate tribunal. 12 At the
conclusion of the trial of an anti-trust case, the court had, pursuant
to Rule 42(a), summarily adjudged plaintiff's counsel guilty of
direct criminal contempt. During the trial there had been marked
differences of opinion between counsel and the court concerning
the propriety of the court's action in ordering, over counsel's
objection, a separate trial of one issue. Further differences had
arisen concerning the manner in which plaintiff's counsel might
offer proof about matters excluded by the court. In reviewing the
conviction, the Circuit Court referred to the "turbulence" under
which the respondents were required to act in protecting their
120 Craig v. Hamey, 331 U.S. 367, (1947).
12 1 Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 294 F.2d 310 (7th Cir. 1961).
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client's rights. 22 Notwithstanding its characterization of the at-
mosphere of the trial, the Circuit Court held that the judge was
not so "involved" as to require application of the Offutt rule
because the record showed that the judge was not "actuated by
personal enmity" toward either of the lawyers held in contempt.123
Whether the five justices who comprised the Offutt majority
would agree with the Circuit Court is highly problematical. The
uncertainty as to whether they would or should agree demon-
strates the unworkable nature of the test of "involvement."
Though the "involvement" theory has little merit, except as
hereinafter pointed out when applied to situations of alleged
personal wrong-doing by the offended judge, it does not follow
that attorneys, litigants or others are defenseless against a court's
arbitrary action in its utilization of the contempt power. It can-
not be overstressed that we deal here only with the possibility of
arbitrary action, not with the probability.
Assuming arguendo that a court has acted arbitrarily in con-
victing someone of contempt, checks and balances comparable
to those found throughout our governmental system exist and
could be used to eliminate or at least to minimize the occasional
arbitrary or excessive use of the contempt power. 24
Most judges are not insensitive to the possibility that, being
human, they may on occasion act arbitrarily. When dealing with
direct contempts, courts are not obliged to grant the contemnor a
122 Id. at 313.
123 Id. at 316.
124 It should not be overlooked that the possibility of arbitrary and un-
warranted action is not limited to lower courts. See State ex rel. Hall v. Nie-
woehner, 116 Mont. 437, 155 P.2d 205 (1944). There an attorney was held
guilty of direct contempt of the Supreme Court of Montana for having pre-
sented to that court a motion seeking to have its records amended to show
that one of the justices had been absent on specific days. The attorney was
really seeking to publicize the fact that this justice and, on a prior occasion,
another justice of that court had served on the National Railroad Adjustment
Board and had been paid for so doing, while having been paid for the same
period by the State of Montana. Whatever might be said about the clumsy manner
in which the attorney sought to publicize these facts, and whether from a
technical standpoint the propriety of Montana justices serving on the National
Railway Adjustment Board was material to the attorney's motion or to the sub-
sequent contempt proceedings, the courts decision, nevertheless, seems little
short of outrageous. Apparently there was no question concerning the truth
of facts asserted by the attorney. How the publication of such a truth could
be contemptuous surpasses understanding. Truth as a defense is discussed more
fully infra, at 399. It goes without saying that there is less likelihood for the
correction of arbitrary action by courts whose actions are not subject to review
by higher courts. Neither the 'involvement" theory, nor any other can provide
complete protection against this possibility.
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hearing.125 It is, however, within the power of a court to grant
a hearing even in such cases. 26
Those judges, and it is safe to assume that this means the over-
whelming majority of judges, who are anxious to minimize the
possibility of their having acted arbitrarily, will grant a hearing,
except in those aggravated situations where a hearing could serve
no useful purpose.
After having been convicted of direct contempt, with or with-
out a hearing, a contemnor may then file a motion to vacate the
judgment of conviction. Under some circumstances, it has been
held that the court is obliged to grant a hearing on such a mo-
tion.2 Whether or not required to grant a hearing, most judges
would give such a motion serious consideration. It seems likely
that any "involvement" because of anger or for any other reason
which may have influenced the judge when he entered the judg-
ment would have abated and would no longer be a factor ipa
passing upon the motion to vacate. Of course, it is always pos-
sible that a judge, having arbitrarily (we assume) convicted some-
one of contempt, would just as arbitrarily adhere to that decision.
But countervailing factors are present, factors which would prob-
ably have controlling influence in most cases. Foremost is the
desire of the overwhelming majority of judges to do justice in
accordance with their oaths of office. Also present is the natural
disinclination of any judge to have one of his rulings reversed by
an appellate tribunal.
As a matter of probability, few would question the asumption
of good faith and pure motives on the part of judges who enter
judgments of conviction for contempt. However, it would be
naive to believe that such probability or the normal self-restraint
of judges of such re-examination as they might undertake when
considering a motion to vacate would avert all arbitrary or other-
125 Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. 289 (1888); People v. Hassakis, 6 Ill.2d 463,
129 N.E.2d 9 (1955); In re Willis, 94 Wash. 180, 162 Pac. 38 (1917).
126 Appeal of Levine, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222 (1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 858 (1953); In re MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 AUt. 521 (1933).
The former case graphically illustrates that the granting of a hearing is not a
cure-all. There the offended judge granted a hearing but he conducted the ex-
amination of favorable witnesses and the cross-examination of unfavorable
witnesses and then, without having testified, decided the case upon the basis
of his personal recollection as to what had occurred. To describe that proceed-
ing as a hearing is illusory.127 Widger v. United States, 244 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1957).
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wise wrongful cohtempt convictions. In this field, as in all other
fields of human endeavor, there will be errors, and the possibility
of occasional arbitrary action cannot be excluded.
Obviously, strict appellate supervision of contempt convictions
affords the best opportunity for minimizing the possibility of
arbitrary action, particularly in those situations where the of-
fended court has proceeded summarily without granting the
contemnor a hearing.
Virtually all jurisdictions require adjudications of direct con-
tempt to contain findings of fact sufficiently detailed to enable an
appellate court to determine whether a contempt has really been
committed. 128 Descriptions of the contemnor's behavior as "im-
proper," or "boisterous," or "menacing," or by other words which
really state conclusions are generally held insufficient. 2 The re-
quirement of detailed findings of fact affords a small measure of
protection against arbitrary action. Unfortunately, most appellate
tribunals content themselves with merely determining whether
the facts set out in the findings are sufficient to show a contempt.
In other words, they accept as conclusive the findings made by
the trial judge and pass only upon their sufficiency.180 Criticism
of this doctrine should not be made without an understanding of
the dilemma confronting appellate tribunals in such situations.
Where a contempt consists of the manner in which words have
been spoken rather than of the words themselves, or where it
consists of actions or the general attitude and the demeanor of
the speaker, neither the record nor any specific degree of detail in
the findings of fact can put an appellate tribunal in as good a
position to pass upon the conduct in question as was the trial
judge. His findings may have been completely justified, though
neither the record nor his descriptive powers can adequately
convey the situation that actually existed. Given a situation
where an attorney has actually sneered at the court, how is the
court to describe such conduct? Must the findings contain a
12 SAnnot., 154 A.L.R. 1227 (1945).
129 Id. at 1289. See also Parmelee Transp. Co. v Keeshin 294 F.2d 310
(7th Cir. 1961); Parmelee Transp. Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961);
People v. Hassakis, 6 Ill.2d 468, 129 N.E.2d 9 (1955).
18OFisher v. Pace, 336 U.S. 155 (1949); Bloom v. People, 23 Colo. 416,
48 Pac. 519 (1897); In re Cary, 165 Minn. 203, 206 N.W. 402 (1925); Appeal
of Levine, 372 Pa. 612, 95 A.2d 222 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 858 (1953);
In re MacDonald, 110 Pa. Super. 352, 168 Atl. 521 (1933); In re Willis, 94 Wash.
180, 162 Pac. 38 (1917).
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listing of the facial muscles and the manner in which they are
exercised in order to produce the expression recognized as a
sneer?'8 ' If an attorney has, by laughing at the court, demon-
strated his contempt and defiance, by what method can the trial
judge adequately inform the reviewing court of this situation with
which he was confronted? 1 2 Must the findings specify the phy-
siological method by which a human being produces the facial
expression and the sounds generally characterized as laughter?
Even if the findings were that specific, would the reviewing court
as a practical matter be in any better position to pass upon an
appeal? 8 3 There probably is no pat solution to this dilemma but
it is not satisfactory that the difficulty of affording effective appel-
late review should serve as an excuse for "rubber stamping" all
contempt actions of a trial judge.
An intelligent approach has been made by the California
courts. There a trial court found that the contemnor made state-
ments "in a loud, insolent, aggressive, belligerent, boisterous,
harsh, offensive and contemptuous tone of voice, and with a
sneering and contemptuous expression on his face and a threaten-
ing demeanor toward said court and the judge thereof.. .. "184
These findings were held insufficient to support the contempt
conviction. That the foregoing findings might properly have been
called conclusions is undoubtedly true. But it is equally true that
there is virtually no way by which the court might have described
the contemnor's conduct so as to avoid the objection. The
majority stressed that the words themselves which had been used
were not contemptuous and that at no time had the judge re-
marked about or cautioned the contemnor for his demeanor,
expression, etc. This "warning" requirement seems to be desir-
able. Its natural tendency will be to restrain impetuous action
131 A finding of "sneering" was held sufficient in Parmelee Transp. Co. v.
Keeshin, 292 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1961).
132 finding that an attorne was guilty of contempt by laughing at the
court was reversed as being merely a conclusion. Ibid.
133These considerations weigh equally heavily agast the "involvement"
theory of the Offutt case. In a trial before another judge, whenever any judge-
witness or, for that matter, any witness attempted to portray by testimony con-
temptuous conduct such as sneering or laughing, there would be the same dif-
ficulty as there is in making findings which are not subject to the objection that
they are mere conclusions. Witnesses are not permitted to state conclusions-any
more than are judges making findings of fact. Thus, the application of the
"involvement" theory in no way tends to solve this most difficlt problem.
'34 Gallagher v. Municipal Court, 31 Cal.2d 784, 192 P.2d 905, 908 (1948).
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that might otherwise be taken by the judge. Nevertheless, the
"warning" requirement is not a panacea. "Warnings" can be the
subject of arbitrary action equally as much as can actual contempt
convictions.
No general rule can or should be formulated in attempting to
meet the difficulties inherent in this type of situation. It does
seem reasonable, however, to expect that appellate tribunals, in
addition to the bare assertion that contempt convictions are not
entitled to the benefit of the presumption accorded other judg-
ments,13 5 should carefully scrutinize the entire record in all cases
of contempt convictions to determine as best they can whether
the record fairly supports the findings of fact of the trial judge.
The presence or absence of "warnings" is one criterion but not the
only one. While no cold record can thoroughly recreate the
atmosphere of a trial, the record can give some idea as to the
circumstances under which the allegedly contemptuous actions
occurred or the contemptuous words were spoken. When the
reviewing court blindly accepts the findings of the trial judge or
when it arbitrarily rejects those findings as conclusions, the
litigants have had appellate review in name only. The dangers
of arbitrary action on the one hand or loss of judicial effectiveness
on the other hand cannot be averted by an abdication of appel-
late responsibility.
ATrACKS UPON JUDICIAL INTEGmTY-TRUTH AS A DEFENSE
Prior comments upon the "judicial involvement" rule laid
down in the Offutt case excluded those situations where the
allegedly contemptuous words or conduct constituted a personal
attack upon the, judge. Attacks upon judicial integrity, i.e.,
charges that the judge has been "fixed," or claims that a particular
judge, improperly sat in a given case because of interest in the
outcome or relationship to one or more of the parties, present a
situation markedly different from that in Offutt where the so-
called "involvement" arose solely out of the judge's emotional
reaction to counsel's tactics. In the former type of situation, the
"involvement" of the attacked judge is apparent, so much so that
l3 5 Platnauer v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. App. 463, 163 Pac. 237 (1941);
People v. Tavernier, 384 .MI1 388, 51 N.E.2d 28 (1943); Ex parte Shull, 221 Mo.
623. 121 S.W. 10 (1909).
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the maxim "no one should be a judge in his own cause" would
seem to be both applicable and controlling. Extended argument
is unnecessary to demonstrate the futility of expecting any person
to pass impartially upon the truth or falsity of charges that he
has betrayed his judicial oath of office.
However shocking it may seem, those accused of direct con-
tempt because of their attacks upon the integrity or impartiality
of the judge have, with but one exception, been uniformly unsuc-
cessful in their efforts to disqualify that judge or to secure a
change of venue. Only in State v. Martin38 has any court per-
mitted the alleged contemnor to urge successfully the disqualifica-
tion of the offended judge or judges. Whether based upon com-
mon law grounds or upon statutory grounds permitting the dis-
qualification of particular judges or allowing a change of venue,
pleas of disqualification have been brushed aside as being inap-
plicable to cases of direct contempt. Throughout the many cases
dealing with this problem, necessity appears to be the sole justifi-
cation for the rule of non-disqualification. Again and again it is
asserted, in one form or another, that any other rule would
permit contemnors to escape punishment by attacking the in-
tegrity of every judge on the bench.3 7 Vain is the search for
justification of the rule of non-disqualification on the ground that
it is fair or equitable. Nor is it defensible as being conducive to
the maintenance of the dignity of the courts. Popular confidence
in judicial integrity can hardly be enhanced when judges ad-
judicate their own virtue. Neither the public nor the legal
profession can be satisfied with the bland assertion that judges
act impersonally in passing upon contempt cases, 38 and this is so
despite the fact that so distinguished a source as Mr. Justice
Holmes may be cited in support thereof. Unedifying is a mild
word when used to describe the spectacle of a judge adjudicating
a person guilty of direct contempt for having made charges
which formed the basis for a libel action already instituted by
that judge against the alleged contemnor.' 39
136 125 Okla. 24, 256 Pac. 681 (1927).
137Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 460, 91 Pac. 100, 101
(1907); State ex tel. Short v. Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 256 Pac. 681, 698 (1927)
dissenting opinion by Riley, J.).
18 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907); United States v. Shipp,
203 U.S. 563, 574 (1903).
189 State ex tel. Short v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927).
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The fear that, unless the offended judge sat in judgment upon
direct contempt charges, there might be no judge available and
possessed of authority to punish a contemnor, may have loomed
large in some jurisdictions due to the insufficiency of statutory
provisions dealing with judicial disqualification or recusal. The
doctrine that no court can or will punish contemptuous acts com-
mitted before another tribunal has contributed to that fear.140
These considerations, it is submitted, should not be decisive for
the indefinite future. Properly drawn statutory provisions can
obviate the possibility that pending contempt proceedings will
remain undetermined because of the lack of a qualified judge.
As is obvious from the Martin case, Oklahoma had such a
statute.141 Other jurisdictions have similar provisions. 1'
The justification of the rule of non-disqualification by advert-
ing to the possibility of an assault upon the integrity of every
judge is an example of the use of the logicians' device familiarly
known as reductio ad absurdum. It is, of course, indisputable that
this tool of reasoning may some times be properly used to reveal
the unsoundness of a particular argument or asserted principle.
However, every problem cannot be resolved by the indiscriminate
application of this type of argument or, for that matter, of any
other form of abstract logic. There is no easy substitute for a
thorough analysis of the problem before the court and of the
effects of every course of action available to the court.
Attacks upon the validity of taxes or licenses have given rise
to the use of the reductio ad absurdum device probably most
familiar to lawyers and laymen alike. Innumerable times have we
been told "the power to tax involves the power to destroy." 43
But -the limitations upon this slogan were enunciated in unfor-
gettable terms by Mr. Justice Holmes when he said, "The power
to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits."'"
1,4o Id. at 71, 256 Pac. at 709.
141 State ex rel. Short v. Martin, 125 Okla. 24, 256 Pac. 681 (1927).
142 Cal. Civ. P. Code § 170; N.J. Stat. Ann. 2A: 15-49 (1952); Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2701.03 (1953).
143 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315, 431 (1819).
144 Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (dissent). In
this case Mr. Justice Holmes argued that a state sales tax could validly be
levied on sales -by a- local merchant to the -United States. - -
Subsequently, Mr. Justice Holmes' statement above quoted was characterized
as. -having brushed away the web of unreality spun by Chief Justice Marshall's
dictum. Graves v. New York ex rel. OKeefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1938) (concurring
opinion by Frankfurter, J.).
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Just as the reductio ad absurdum maneuver does not provide
an automatic solution in taxing and licensing situations, so too, it
is highly doubtful that it offers a complete or even a satisfactory
answer to the very difficult problem presented in direct contempt
cases involving personal attacks upon the judge. There is a vast
difference between a good faith attack upon the integrity or
impartiality of one judge or tribunal and a broad-scale vendetta
against an entire judicial system in order to avoid punishment or
to avoid the imposition of civil liability. It does not follow either
logically or practically that efforts to assure a fair trial for those
accused of offenses against the judiciary necessarily result in
depriving the judiciary of the power to deal with the rare situa-
tion presented by a completely unscrupulous party or attorney.
Significantly, the reductio ad absurdum type of reasoning has
been utilized only in cases of direct contempt. Although it would
seem to have equal application to cases of indirect contempt, it
has not been so employed. So far as this writer has been able to
ascertain, no court has questioned the propriety of judicial recusal
in a case of indirect contempt whether the recusal resulted from
action taken on the court's own motion or on the motion by one
of the parties. Indeed, there has in recent years been a marked
tendency on the part of appellate courts to require the recusal of
the offended judge where personal attacks upon the judge form
the basis of indirect contempt charges. 145 No court has attempted
to explain why the argument of necessity relied upon in cases of
direct contempt does not apply with equal force to cases of
indirect contempt. Conversely, the courts have failed to explain
why those considerations which are sufficient to bring about the
recusal of the offended judge in indirect contempt cases should
not produce the same results in direct contempt cases. Apparently
no court has gone further than to recognize the delicacy of the
situation in which the rule of non-disqualification places the
offended judge.146 This concern for the sensibilities of the offended
judge is touching but hardly persuasive. It might be argued that
such concern is completely irrelevant. Fundamentally, the ques-
tion to be decided is whether the effective functioning of the
judiciary can be preserved only by the stringent limitations upon
145 See cases cited note 84 supra.
140 Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458, 91 Pac. 100 (1907).
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individual rights presently imposed in direct contempt proceed-
ings. It is one thing to permit summary procedures in direct
contempt cases where the alleged contempt does not consist of
some form of adverse reflection upon the judge personally and
where consequently there is no reason to believe that the judge
in whose presence the offense takes place cannot dispense justice
in an impartial manner. It is, however, quite another thing where
the contemptuous words or conducts are directly related to the
judge who would ordinarily pass upon the contempt charges. In
the absence of some overpowering emergency requiring im-
mediate action by the offended judge, the emphasis would prop-
erly seem to be placed upon the flagrant denial of the basic rights
of the person accused of contempt than upon the sensibilities of
the offended judge. In the event of a hearing, what chance does
the accused have for any sort of a fair trial at the hands of the
judge accused of misconduct? Even if guilty, what chance would
the contemnor have of receiving punishment commensurate with
the offense when the punishment was measured by the insulted
judge?
The Supreme Court has never determined whether in a direct
contempt proceeding the presiding judge is disqualified by reason
of the fact that the alleged contempt consists of adverse reflections
upon the judge himself. Since, in Offutt, the judge was deemed
too "involved" to pass upon a direct contempt which was in no
way a reflection upon him, it seems highly probable that the
"involvement" theory would be applied to "personal" contempts.
Such application of the "involvement" theory would, in this
writer's opinion, be justified. 4 r
Safeguards for the rights of those accused of crime dominate
our criminal jurisprudence. Part of the price that we willingly
pay for minimizing the chance of conviction of an innocent person
is the occasional escape from punishment of a guilty person.
There is little likelihood that a breakdown of the judicial system
would result from an application of similar considerations to cases
of direct contempt, just as they are applied to cases of indirect
contempt and to all other forms of offense against the government,
be they denoted "crimes" or otherwise. Barring an emergency,
147 See generally United States v. Bradt, 294 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1961).
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no judge should sit in any direct contempt case where his ruling
will in effect constitute an adjudication of his own integrity.
Unless an alleged contemnor is permitted to plead and prove
truth as a complete defense to the pending charges, any discussion
of the propriety of the offended judge sitting in judgment is of
little more than academic interest. Proof of the making or
publishing of defamatory statements would suffice. Despite the
many cases involving contempt charges based upon accusations
against a judge, the availability of truth as a defense has received
remarkably little consideration. Only once has the Supreme Court
expressed itself on this subject. 148 There, contempt charges
against a publisher were based upon the assertion that the
Supreme Court of Colorado had acted in pending cases pursuant
to a scheme to seat Republican candidates in place of lawfully
elected Democrats and that two of the judges of the court had
obtained their seats upon the bench as part of the scheme. The
truth of the publication was pleaded as one of the defenses which
the publisher sought to interpose but, without passing thereon,
the Supreme Court of Colorado found the publisher guilty of
contempt. In a seven-to-two decision, the United States Supreme
Court dismissed a writ of error upon the ground that no federal
constitutional question was presented.
Mr. Justice Holmes, writing for the majority, found it unneces-
sary to consider whether the conviction for contempt infringed
upon freedom of the press since, in his view, the publications,
even if true, were nonetheless contemptuous. He said:
In the next place, the rule applied to criminal libels ap-
plies yet more clearly to contempts. A publication likely
to reach the eyes of a jury, declaring a witness in a pending
cause a perjurer, would be nonetheless a contempt that
it was true. It would tend to obstruct the administration
of justice, because even a correct conclusion is not to be
reached or helped in that way, if our system of trials is
to be maintained. The theory of our system is that the con-
clusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by
evidence and argument in open court, and not by any
outside influence, whether of private talk or public print. 49




With profound deference to the views of the distinguished
author of the Patterson opinion, it is by no means clear that the
rule prohibiting truth as a defense in criminal libel proceedings
should be applied to criminal contempt proceedings. It is not
within the scope of this article to discuss the shortcomings of the
ancient libel rule, nor the modem tendency to abolish or amelio-
rate that harsh doctrine.' 50 Nevertheless, irrespective of what the
rule should be in a criminal libel proceeding, elementary justice
would seem to require that in contempt proceedings the alleged
contemnor should be permitted to establish the truth of his
charges against the judiciary. The adversary system which we
have evolved as the best means for determining the truth of
disputed matters can function only when the tribunal, whose
responsibility it is to adjudicate the dispute, is itself free from
suspicion. If, in fact, the judge in any pending case has been
"fixed" or has engaged in other conduct inimical to the rendering
of an impartial decision based solely upon the evidence and the
law applicable thereto, the cornerstone for the entire judicial
system has been undermined. The exposure of such facts can in
no sense be regarded as an obstruction of justice. Those facts,
if true, conclusively establish that under the circumstances pre-
vailing no justice can or will be administered.
The example cited by Mr. Justice Holmes in support of the
proposition that truth should not be a defense to criminal con-
tempt charges is valid enough but hardly comparable with the
publication actually involved in the Patterson case. Our system
of jurisprudence requires that matters such as the credibility of
witnesses or the weight of the evidence be determined solely
upon the evidence adduced and the fact finder's appraisal of the
demeanor of the witnesses. Explanation may be furnished only
by the court's instructions to the jury and arguments may be
addressed to it only by counsel. An obstruction of the operation
of such a judicial system results from any outside attempt to
influence the judicial proceedings and its character as an obstruc-
tion does not change simply because the comment consists of
truthful statements. The comments themselves constitute the of-
fense and their truth or falsity is immaterial. Such comments are
punishable because of their tendency to cause litigation to be
150 Ray, Truth a Defense to Libel, 16 Minn. L. Rev. 43, 47 (1931).
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determined in a manner not authorized by the rules. Punishment
does not result, as in the case of criminal libel, from a general
policy of punishing all defamatory statements whether true or
false.
Accusations against a judge should be placed in a different
category. If true, such charges are clearly material. Far from
seeking to influence litigation in a non-authorized manner, such
publications seek the opposite. By pointing out that the judge's
derelictions are such that there is no chance that the pending
litigation will be determined by an impartial and unprejudiced
tribunal in accordance with the basic concepts of our judicial
system, such charges should be considered as seeking to assure
that justice will be dispensed pursuant to the established rule.
State courts have, on the whole, recognized that truth should
be a defense in contempt proceedings. 151 Some cases have, with-
out discussing the matter, proceeded on the assumption that
truthful statements are not contemptuous. For example, there
would have been no point to the lengthy hearings in the Oklahoma
cases hereinbefore discussed if the truth of the charges was
immaterial.152 Similarly, in the case against Owens,153 the court's
reference to its having called upon the alleged contemnor three
times to produce any evidence that he had in support of his
charges and its further reference to the fact that three times
Owens stood mute was meaningful only if the truth of the charges
was relevant.
While contempt proceedings may not be the ideal vehicle for
the determination of charges of judicial misconduct, when that
misconduct either has caused harm to a litigant or imminently
threatens such harm, the litigant or his attorney may have no
choice but to make the charges during the pending litigation.
Almost inevitably, the making of such charges will result in the
filing of contempt proceedings. It is difficult to imagine a grosser
miscarriage of justice than that which would result from giving
a litigant or his attorney the unenviable choice between suffering
151Lamberson v. Superior Court, 151 Cal. 458 463, 91 Pac. 100 (1907);
In re Dingley, 182 Mich. 44, 148 N.W. 218 (19145; Ex parte Pease, 123 Tex.
Crim. App. 43, 57 S.W.2d 575 (1933); Ex parte O'Fiel, 93 Tex. Crim. App. 214,
246 S.W. 664 (1923); But see State ex rel. Giblin v. Sullivan, 157 Fla. 496, 26
So.2d 509 (1946).
152 State ex rel. Short v. Martin, 125 Okla. 51, 256 Pac. 667 (1927)
153 State ex rel. Short v. Owens, 125 Okla. 66, 256 Pac. 704 (1927).
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in silence while pending litigation was disposed of by a "fixed"
judge or risking conviction and punishment for criminal contempt
for exposing the truth. Such a choice can be avoided only if truth
be recognized as a valid defense to contempt charges.
CONCLUSION
The importance of the right to a fair trial by an impartial
tribunal and of the other rights bestowed upon those accused of
offenses against any branch of government cannot be emphasized
too strongly. However, it must be recognized that those rights
are not self-enforcing. In the absence of a judicial system with
power to safeguard them, individual rights would degenerate into
meaningless abstractions. Devotion to the maintenance of indi-
vidual rights to be effective must necessarily include devotion to
a judiciary possessed of power sufficient to permit its effective
functioning.
If the judiciary operated in a vacuum, there would be little
difficulty in determining the scope of the contempt power neces-
sary to enable it to discharge its duties. Considered in isolation,
it seems almost absurdly easy to effectuate a guarantee of a fair
trial. Unfortunately, human conduct does not lend itself to such
fragmentation. Unusual is the situation that can be soundly
analyzed by considering only the impact of one particular set of
principles rather than the inter-play between and accommodation
of competing principles. When fundamental principles come into
conflict, as they do so frequently in contempt cases, the difficulties
of affording each its proper scope cannot be dissolved by the
application of any trick formula, logical device or abstract gen-
eralization. While some aspects of the conflict cannot be resolved
at all, the impossibility of an ideal solution is no justification for
ignoring the problem as so many of the cases in this area have
done.
The problems inherent in direct contempt cases strikingly
illustrate the inadequacy of abstract logic as an infallible yard-
stick. Neither of the principles with which we are here concerned
can be applied to their logical extreme without bringing about
an undue curtailment of the other principle. The power to punish
direct contempt summarily when the circumstances so require has
always been recognized as indispensable to any judicial system.
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No modem development has obliterated the need for such power.
Undeniably the contempt power, like any governmental or private
power, may be abused but this is hardly a valid argument for
abolishing that power. Every person, whether he be behind the
wheel of an automobile or performing some governmental func-
tion, has the potentiality for exercising the power with which he
may be possessed wisely or foolishly, reasonably or arbitrarily.
In direct contempt cases the dangers undoubtedly are magnified
because adequate appellate review is difficult to attain. In view
of these dangers, no one would dispute the need for caution in
the exercise of the contempt power. The necessity for such
exercise should not blithely be assumed, but neither should the
undoubted necessity for the existence of the contempt power be
overlooked because of overzealous concentration upon theoretical
infringements of individual rights which might occur. Nebulous
notions of "involvement," as exemplified by the Offutt decision,
endanger an effective judiciary. Where, however, direct contempt
charges result from attacks upon judicial integrity, the considera-
tions are not nebulous. The threat to individual rights is apparent
and immediate. The great weight of authority to the contrary
notwithstanding, an exception to the rule of non-disqualification
in direct contempt cases is, in this writer's opinion, required in
those comparatively rare situations. The importance of public
confidence in the judiciary demands that no judge sit in a case
where his integrity has been impugned. Furthermore, every al-
leged contemnor should be granted an opportunity to establish
the truth of his charges as a complete defense. Suppression of the
truth can never provide either a solid or an acceptable foundation
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